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Abstract 
Maladaptive emotion regulation is an established vulnerability marker for 
depression. Within a diathesis-stress framework individual differences in emotion 
regulation constitute sensitivity to stress, such that people who are less able to 
effectively regulate their emotions are more likely to become depressed when stress is 
encountered. Markers of maladaptive emotion regulation have been examined from 
affective, neurological, and cognitive perspectives and, for the most part, have been 
examined in independent lines of research. As such, the independent and interactive 
contributions of maladaptive emotion regulation markers are still unknown. The 
current thesis addresses this gap with a longitudinal study. Emotion regulation 
markers and depression were assessed at the outset of the study (time one) then life 
stress and depression were measured three months (time two) and twelve months 
(time three) later. Three trait measures of emotion regulation were assessed: 
spontaneous emotion regulation (as indexed by startle reactivity following negative 
images), frontal and parietal resting EEG asymmetries, and brooding rumination. All 
emotion regulation markers were found to be independent markers of vulnerability to 
depression. The emotion regulation markers measured at time one were then tested 
within a diathesis stress framework to predict stress sensitivity at time two. Poorer 
online regulation interacted with life stress to predict depression.  That is, poor online 
regulators were sensitive to stress at three months, whereas good online regulators 
were not. Stress sensitivity was tested again at time three, twelve months after the 
initial assessment. At this time point frontal asymmetry, parietal asymmetry and life 
stress interacted to predict depression. When right parietal activity was low, rightward 
frontal asymmetries showed more sensitivity to stress. However, people with leftward 
asymmetries showed less stress sensitivity. Brooding predicted depression at three 
 vi  
months but not at twelve months and did not interact with stress at either time point. 
The findings of this thesis show that, within the diathesis-stress framework, online 
regulation measures indicate short-term sensitivity to stress; however, EEG 
asymmetry measures show sensitivity to stress in the longer term.  
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Chapter One  
Emotion Regulation and Vulnerability to Depression 
Depression is a common mental health disorder with broadly reaching 
individual and societal consequences. The distress experienced by people with 
depression affects many facets of their personal and professional lives - placing strain 
on relationships and reducing productivity and ability to perform at work (Stewart, 
Ricci, Chee, Hahn & Morganstein, 2003). According to the World Health 
Organization, depression is the leading cause of disability in terms of years lost to the 
disorder (World Health Organization, 2008). Prevalence rates indicate that 
approximately 16-19% of people will become depressed at some point in their lives 
(Bromet, Andrade, Hawang, Sampson, Alonso, de Girolamo et al., 2011; Kessler, 
Berglund, Chiu, Demler, Heringa, Hiripr et al., 2004; Oakley-Brown, 2006) and show 
that depression affects almost twice as many women as men. (Kessler, McGonagle, 
Swartz, Blazer & Nelson, 1993, Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001; Patten, Wang, Williams, 
Currie, Beck, Maxwell, & el-Guebaly, 2006). These epidemiological data highlight 
the importance of research aimed at understanding the causes of depression. 
Factors that lead to first episodes of depression are pivotal to understanding this 
disorder. Approximately half of those who experience a first episode of depression 
will have another, and for many these episodes recur throughout their lives (Klein & 
Allmann, 2014; Mattisson, Bogren, Horstmann, Munk-Jörgensen & Nettelbladt, 2007; 
Moffitt, Caspi, Taylor, Kokaua, Milne, Polanczyk, & Poulton, 2010). As the number 
of episodes mount, the typical duration of each episode increases and the time 
between episodes shortens (Bolland & Keller, 2002). The triggers for depressive 
episodes also change; first episodes of depression are likely to be precipitated by a 
strong stressor, but the stress required to trigger depression decreases with each 
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episode (Lewinsohn, Allen, Seeley, & Gotlib, 1999; Post, 1992). Put simply, a first 
episode of depression drastically reduces the stress threshold needed to trigger future 
episodes. A major task for psychological researchers is therefore to identify factors 
contributing to the critical first episode.  
Stress and Depression 
Stressful events have a well-established role in the onset of first episodes of 
depression. Evidence for a stress-depression relationship has been observed using a 
variety of stress measures, including: daily hassles (e.g., see Lazarus, DeLongis, 
Folkman, & Gruen, 1985); major life events (e.g., see Monroe, Slavich & Georgiades, 
2014); and chronic stress (e.g., see Klein & Allmann, 2014). However, while the 
stress-depression relationship is robust, the relationship is also complex and dynamic 
(see Monroe & Simons, 1991). Of particular importance, the experience of stress is 
not necessarily followed by depression (e.g. see Hammen, 2006; Monroe & Reid, 
2009). Many individuals are resilient to stress, meaning they can experience high 
levels of stress without experiencing depression (Bonanno, 2004; Coifman & 
Bonanno, 2010; Hammen, 2005), whilst other individuals are sensitive to stress, and 
go on to experience depression after a stressful episode (Hammen, 2015). Individual 
stress sensitivity across the population can be conceptualised as a continuum, ranging 
from highly sensitive to resilient (Willner, Scheel-Krüger, & Belzung, 2013). In order 
to understand first depression episodes, it is necessary to determine which individual 
characteristics interact with stress to constitute vulnerability to depression. 
The Stress Response 
In order to examine factors that may interact with stress to lead to depression, it 
is important to understand what the stress-response is in itself. The stress response 
consists of a number of diverse and highly coordinated processes that are executed 
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across multiple levels of psychobiological functioning (McEwen, 2007). Instigating 
the stress response is essential under conditions of acute threat, where it drives 
changes in both central and periperal nervous systems to produce adaptive responses 
and aid survival (Theil & Dretsch, 2011). Under conditions of stress, individuals 
instigate automatic and emotionally motivated response tendencies that bias attention 
toward threating stimuli, and initiate defensive emotional responses. However, the 
stress response comes with physiological and psychological costs whereby, under 
conditions of prolonged or chronic stress, the load of maintaining the stress response 
begins to exhaust available resources (Arnsten, 2009; McEwen, 2007).  
The brain is central to the stress response. It determines what is deemed a 
stressor and how an individual will respond to it. At the same time, the brain itself 
undergoes systemic and functional changes when stress is experienced (McEwen, 
2006). The influence of stress on the central nervous system has been proposed to be 
a key factor in the development of depression (see Willner et al., 2013). In particular, 
neurological changes as a result of stress affect how emotion is processed and 
regulated by the brain. Prefrontal cortical regions are heavily responsible for the 
regulation of attention (important for identifying threatening stimuli) and emotional 
responses, via connections to parietal and subcortical regions respectively (Lee, 
Heller, van Reekum, Nelson, & Davidson, 2012; Ochsner, Ray, Cooper, Robertson, 
Chopra, Gabrieli, & Gross, 2004). Arnsten (2009) proposes that acute stress shifts 
neural processing transiently from slower more controlled processing driven by the 
prefrontal cortex, to rapid and reflexive processing driven by subcortical regions (e.g., 
the amygdala). However, chronic stress may have prolonged effects on the prefrontal 
cortex, resulting in long-term influences on its function that result in a focus on 
negative information and negative affect, and may ultimately lead to depression.  
  
4 
Diathesis-Stress Model 
Of particular interest in the development of depression are the effects of life 
stress (e.g. Post, 1992), that is, the stress experienced as individuals engage in their 
day-to-day lives. Life stressors can range from psychosocial stressors such as the loss 
of an interpersonal relationship (e.g., the death of a parent or the break up of a 
romantic relationship), through to changes in life circumstances, such as 
unemployment. The diathesis-stress model considers the role of individual differences 
in response to stress in predicting depressive outcomes. It proposes that pre-existing 
traits (diatheses) make an individual more (or less) susceptible to the deleterious 
effects of stress (Monroe & Simons, 1991; Willner et al., 2013). In other words, 
diatheses moderate the stress–depression relationship, meaning some individuals are 
more vulnerable to depression in response to stress than others.  
A wide range of factors can constitute a vulnerability within the diathesis-stress 
model. Research from different facets of psychology has explored possible 
vulnerability traits ranging from genetic (e.g. Caspi, Sugden, Moffit, Taylor, Craig, 
Harrington et al., 2003;), to neurological (e.g. Henriques & Davidson, 1991), to 
cognitive (e.g Alloy, Abramson, Whitehouse, Hogan, Panzarella, & Rose, 2006), and 
to interpersonal (e.g. Shahar, Joiner, Zuroff, & Blatt, 2004) factors. In this thesis, I 
focus on trait measures of emotion regulation as potential diatheses. Specifically, I 
will examine the moderating effects of patterns of frontal and parietal 
electroencephalogram (EEG) activity, spontaneous emotion regulation ability, and 
brooding rumination within the diathesis-stress model.  
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Emotion Regulation and Vulnerability to Depression 
Emotion regulation is a good candidate diathesis within the diathesis-stress 
model. It is an important factor in determining how individuals adjust to stress 
(Bonanno & Burton, 2013) and atypical emotion regulation is common across 
psychopathologies, particularly mood disorders (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Schweizer, 2010; Gross & Munõz, 1995; Nolen-Heoksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008; Rottenberg, Gross, & Gotlib, 2005). Emotion regulation is the altering of the 
quality, intensity, duration, or type of an emotional response (Gross & Thomson, 
2007; Gross, 2013) and is conceptualised as a distinct set of processes from the 
emotional response itself (see Koole, 2009, but see Gross & Feldman Barrett, 2011).  
Emotional responses consist of three core dimensions: subjective experience, 
physiological responses, and behavioral responses. Emotional responses play an 
important role in ensuring an individual can adapt appropriately and flexibly. When 
an emotional response is triggered, motivation systems are activated to guide 
behavioural responses, and these depend on the valence of the situation. For example, 
in a positive situation (such as finding a food source) an individual might be guided to 
approach the situation. However, in a negative situation (such as the appearance of a 
predator) it may be more adaptive to be motivated to withdraw from the situation. The 
motivational priming hypothesis (Lang, 1995) argues that the neurobiological 
underpinnings of emotion can motivate behavior through two core systems: (1) a 
defensive system that motivates protective behavioral and physiological responses 
(e.g., withdrawal) in order to avoid harm or overcome threat, and is typically 
associated with negative subjective feelings (e.g., fear or disgust); and (2) an 
appetitive system that motivates life sustaining and reproductive (e.g., approach) 
related behaviors and physiological responses in order to benefit from potentially 
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advantageous situations, and is often associated with positive subjective feelings (e.g., 
enthusiasm or sexual arousal).  
The multi-process model (Bradley, Codispoti, & Lang, 2006; Bradley & Lang, 
2007) proposes that motivational priming (and associated emotional response) occurs 
across a series of distinct stages.  First, emotional challenge is followed by an early 
orienting response, where salient perceptual features of potentially relevant emotional 
stimuli (high arousal stimuli, regardless of valence) capture perceptual and attentional 
resources, enabling further assessment of the emotional significance of the stimulus 
(see Bradley, Keil & Lang, 2012). During the early orienting stage, autonomic 
responses are also activated in preparation for potential action (Bradley, 2009; 
Bradley et al., 2012). If the stimulus is deemed relevant, the emotional response 
progresses to the next stage; alternatively if the stimulus is not deemed relevant the 
response can be regulated (i.e., stopped).  
In the second stage of the emotional response the relevant motivational priming 
system (i.e., the defensive or appetitive system) is activated. The appetitive system is 
engaged in response to positively valenced stimuli and the defensive system is 
engaged in response to negatively valenced stimuli. (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & 
Lang, 2001). At this stage, the emotional response may be regulated if no further 
processing or behavioural response is deemed necessary. However, if further 
behavioural response is required (i.e., approach or withdrawal), then physiological 
(e.g., increased heart rate) and subjective (e.g., feeling scared) changes occur in order 
to support the appropriate behavioural response (Bradley, Moulder, & Lang, 2005). 
Of particular importance, if a significant threat is detected, a stress response is 
activated in order to help the organism cope with the threat (Thiel & Dretsch, 2011).   
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The regulation of emotion can occur at any stage of the response. Emotion 
regulation processes vary along a continuum from highly effortful, intentional, 
attempts to alter the response, through to automatic, implicit, regulation processes that 
occur without intention (Berkman & Leibermann, 2009; Gyurak, Gross & Etkin, 
2011; Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007). Multiple strategies may be drawn upon to 
regulate a specific emotional response (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013) and 
strategies can vary depending on the environmental context (Aldao, 2013). Emotion 
regulation strategies differ in their effectiveness (Gross, 2013). Additionally, the 
regulation strategies that an individual tends to use habitually can vary between 
people (Aldao, Nolen-Heoksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Berkman & Leiberman, 2009). 
Developing adaptive emotion regulation abilities is considered a key achievement of 
developmental maturation (Diamond & Aspinwell, 2003).  
Depression is characterised by atypical emotion regulation (Aldao, Nolen-
Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). The adaptive and flexible use of emotion regulation 
is an important buffer against stress (see Troy & Mauss, 2011), as has been shown in 
both cross-sectional (Moore et al., 2008; Troy, Shallcross & Mauss, 2013; Troy et al., 
2010) and prospective designs (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal & Coifman, 2004; 
Pakenham, 2005; Shallcross, Troy, Bolland & Mauss, 2010; Van der Veek, Kraaij & 
Garnefski, 2009; Vanderhasselt, Koster, Onraedt, Bruyneel, Goubert, De Raedt, 
2014). Clinically depressed patients rated by a clinical interviewer as more skilled 
emotion regulators (assessed using the Operationalized Skills Assessment Inventory; 
Stenzel et al., 2010) show more symptom improvement at discharge than poorer 
emotion regulators (Fehlinger, Stumpenhorst, Stenzel & Rief, 2013). However, a 
distinction should be made between emotion regulation capability and emotion 
regulation tendency. Emotion regulation capability refers to an individual’s ability to 
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engage in a regulatory process, while emotion regulation tendency refers to the 
strategies that a person typically or habitually uses regardless of ability (see Berkman 
& Leiberman, 2009). For example, an individual may be capable of using a particular 
emotion regulation strategy (e.g. cognitive reappraisal) when asked to do so, but may 
not employ this strategy habitually when they encounter emotional events in their day 
to day lives (e.g. Suri, Whittaker & Gross, 2014). This distinction is important as 
depressed people have a tendency to draw upon less effective strategies, when 
attempting to alleviate negative mood (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006; Joormann & Gotlib, 
2010).  
Individual differences in emotion regulation and responses to stress are of 
particular interest in studies of depresssion. It has been proposed that it is the 
dysregulation of the stress response and associated negative emotions, as opposed to 
the stress response itself, that underlies depression (Flynn & Rudolph, 2007). 
Stressful events are by their nature emotional events (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 
1978), and physiological responses driven by the stress response are often percieved 
as negative emotional experiences (Thiel & Dretch, 2011). Therefore, there is good 
reason to consider individual differences in emotion regulation tendency when 
examining vulnerability to depression within the diathesis-stress framework. In this 
thesis I consider three markers of emotion regulation tendency: neurological traits as 
revealed in resting measures of cortical activity; online emotional responding and 
regulation as indicated in the startle eye-blink paradigm, and cognitive coping 
strategies as assessed through self-report of ruminative tendencies. 
Measures of Trait Emotion Regulation 
 Regional electroencephalographic asymmetries. Prefrontal cortical function 
and activity within a frontal-parietal network have been strongly linked to emotion 
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regulation (Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012; Lee et al., 2012), and atypical patterns of 
functioning across these regions has been associated with mood disorders (Johnstone, 
Van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; Willner et al., 2013). As such, 
measures of brain activity may provide a good index of neurological vulnerability to 
disorders involving poor emotion regulation (Davidson, 2004) In this thesis, I 
specifically focus on hemispheric differences in resting brain activity as a possible 
diathesis. 
Hemispheric asymmetries within the alpha band (8-13Hz), as measured by 
electroencephalographic (EEG) activity, are of interest in the study of emotion, 
emotion regulation, and depression (Coan & Allen, 2004; Thibodeau, Jorgenson, & 
Kim, 2006). Alpha power is typically interpreted as the inverse of cognitive activity 
(Coan & Allen, 2004; Klimesch, 1999). Comparing alpha over a region of one 
hemisphere relative to the equivalent region of the opposite hemisphere provides a 
relative measure of left versus right activity (Allen, Coan & Nazarian, 2004; Coan & 
Allen, 2004). Of particular relevance to the study of depression and emotion 
regulation has been measurement of asymmetric activity while participants are at rest 
over frontal cortical and, to a lesser extent, parietal cortical areas (see Davidson, 
2004; Harmon-Jones et al., 2010;). Resting frontal asymmetry has been shown to be a 
reliable (Hagemann, 2004) and relatively stable trait (Allen et al., 2004). Asymmetric 
frontal alpha appears to be generated in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC; 
Pizzagalli, Sherwood, Henriques, & Davidson, 2005), and may reflect activity in a 
frontal-parietal network (see Laufs et al., 2003; Mantini, Perrucci, Dal Gratta, Romani 
& Corbetta, 2007) that is engaged in tasks requiring executive control and regulation 
of emotion (Ochsner et al., 2012).  
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Three interpretations have provided potential explanations of the relationship 
between frontal asymmetry and emotion; a valence based interpretation, a motivation 
based interpretation and a cognitive control based interpretation. The valence 
interpretation argues that leftward frontal asymmetry is associated with positive 
emotionality and rightward frontal asymmetry with negative emotionality (e.g. Heller, 
Nitschke, & Miller, 1998). Evidence for this interpretation came from findings that 
depression (Henriques & Davidson, 1991), remitted depression (Henriques & 
Davidson, 1990), and trait negative affect measures were related to rightward 
asymmetry and positive trait affect measures to leftward asymmetry (Tomarken et al., 
1992; Tomarken & Davidson, 1994). However, this interpretation may have failed to 
capture the full extent of the relationship between frontal asymmetry and emotion.  
The motivational direction hypothesis has gained support (see Harmon-Jones, 
2010). The motivation hypothesis argues that frontal asymmetries are better 
interpreted in terms of motivation to approach or withdrawal from a situation. 
According to this interpretation leftward asymmetries are associated with approach 
motivation and rightward with withdrawal motivation, regardless of valence (e.g. 
Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1997; Sutton & Davidson, 2010). Often positive emotions are 
associated with approach (e.g. joy) and negative emotions with withdrawal (e.g. fear; 
Lang, 1995). However, Carver and Harmon-Jones (2009) point out that an approach 
motivation can also be negative, such as when anger (a negative emotion) provides 
motivation to approach a threat (e.g. to defend of one’s position). In support of this 
hypothesis subjective measures of trait anger have been associated with more leftward 
frontal asymmetries (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998). Moreover, this relationship is 
independent of attitudes to anger (i.e. trait anger is not related to positive attitudes 
towards anger), thus the association between trait anger and leftward asymmetry is 
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not due to anger being experienced as a positive emotion (Harmon-Jones, 2004). As 
anger is a negative emotion and also motivates approach behaviours, findings that 
anger is associated with leftward frontal asymmetry supports the motivation 
hypothesis (Harmon-Jones et al., 2010).  
The asymmetric inhibition model provides a third explanation of the role frontal 
asymmetry in emotion processes, with specific regard to emotion regulation 
(Grimshaw & Carmel, 2014). This model proposes that frontal asymmetry reflects an 
individual’s ability to recruit executive control processes that govern attention 
systems. Bottom up processes draw attentional resources toward emotional 
information, due to the adaptive value of such information. However, current goals 
(and well being) often benefit from inhibition of such emotional distraction. 
Executive control processes provide top down control over attentional systems, 
regulating non-beneficial emotional responses and maintaining attention on the task at 
hand. Relative leftward frontal asymmetries are proposed to reflect an individual’s 
ability to successfully control negative emotional information. On the other hand, 
relative rightward frontal asymmetries are proposed to reflect ability to control 
positive emotional information. Therefore, relative leftward frontal asymmetry 
reflects better emotion regulation ability of negative information and relative 
rightward frontal asymmetry poorer emotion regulation of negative information. 
Relatively rightward frontal EEG asymmetries are associated with current 
(Gotlib, Ranganath, & Rosenfeld, 1998; Henriques & Davidson, 1991) and remitted 
(Gotlib et al., 1998; Henriques & Davidson, 1990; Stewart, Coan, Towers & Allen, 
2011) depression, and with familial (Field & Diego, 2008) and genetic (Bismark et 
al., 2010; Feng et al., 2012; Smit, Posthuma, Boomsma, & De Geus, 2007) risk of the 
disorder. Most relevant to the current study, relative rightward frontal asymmetries 
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have been shown to predict the onset of depression over time (Mitchell & Possell, 
2012; Nusslock et al., 2011; Pössel, Lo, Fritz, & Seemann, 2008). In other words, 
relative rightward frontal asymmetry precedes depression and is therefore not simply 
a marker of depression itself, but rather reflects a vulnerability to depression. In a 
cross-sectional study frontal asymmetry scores, measured while watching an 
emotional film, interacted with stress to predict depressive symptoms. Children at 
high risk of depression who had relative rightward frontal asymmetries showed more 
sensitivity to stress than those with relative leftward frontal asymmetries (Lopez-
Durren, Nusslock, George & Kovacs, 2011). These studies indicate a direct predictive 
relationship between rightward frontal asymmetry and depression. However, no 
studies have prospectively tested whether resting frontal asymmetries act as a 
diathesis within the diathesis-stress model. If so, one might expect a stronger 
relationship between stress and depression in vulnerable people (with relative 
rightward frontal asymmetry) than in those who are more resilient (with relative 
leftward frontal asymmetry).  
Parietal asymmetries have received less attention than frontal asymmetries but 
are also associated with depression. It has been argued that it is specifically right 
parietal cortical function that is impaired in depression, reflecting deficiencies in the 
processing of emotional information associated with reduced arousal (e.g., Bruder, 
2003; Heller, 1993; Heller & Nitschke, 1997; Moratti, Rubio, Campo, Keil, & Ortiz, 
2008). Therefore, when interpreting parietal asymmetries in this thesis, I discuss 
findings in terms of relative high or low right parietal activity (rather than relative 
leftward or rightward asymmetry scores as is conventional when discussing frontal 
asymmetries). Relatively low right parietal activity has been associated with current 
depression (Bruder, Fong, Tenke, Leite, Towey, Stewart et al., 1997; Kentgen, Tenke, 
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Pine, Fong, Klein, & Bruder, 2000), previous depression (Stewart et al., 2011), higher 
depression scores in a non-clinical sample (Blackhart, Minnix & Kline, 2006), and 
familial risk for depression (Bruder et al., 2012; Bruder, Tenke, Warner, & 
Weissman, 2007; Henriques and Davidson 1990). Additionally, in a longitudinal 
design, low right parietal activity measured at age six was found to predict established 
cognitive vulnerabilities to depression at age seven (Hayden, Shankman, Oliion, 
Durbin, Tenke, Bruder, & Klein, 2008).  
While the majority of depression research has examined frontal and parietal 
asymmetries separately, the interaction between these two regions may provide a 
more comprehensive account of psychopathology (Heller, 1993; Heller & Nitschke, 
1997). Similar to previous models, the Circumplex model argues that frontal 
asymmetry reflects the valence component of emotional experience, with leftward 
asymmetries reflecting positive experience, and rightward asymmetries reflecting 
negative experience. However, additionally the Circumplex model proposes that 
parietal asymmetry indexes the arousal component of emotional experience, with 
rightward parietal asymmetry (that is, high right parietal activity) indexing high 
arousal, and leftward asymmetry (that is, low right parietal activity) reflecting low 
arousal. Importantly, it is the interaction between the valence (frontal) and arousal 
(parietal) systems that reflects mood disorders. Depression is characterised by a 
pattern of negative valence and low arousal, therefore the neural correlates reflecting 
this pattern should be rightward frontal asymmetry and low right parietal activity 
(leftward parietal asymmetry).  
The Circumplex model is useful as it predicts dissociated patterns of neural 
correlates for depression and anxiety. Anxiety is characterised by feelings of worry 
and feeling tense (Heller & Nitschke, 1998). Anxiety and depression are both 
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associated with negative emotional responses and are thus both reflected by rightward 
frontal asymmetries. However, anxiety is associated with high arousal emotional 
responses whereas depression is associated with low arousal emotional responses. 
Therefore, dissociable patterns of right parietal activity should distinguish these 
disorders, such that anxious individuals have high right parietal activity (high arousal) 
and depressed individuals have low right parietal activity (low arousal; Heller, 1993; 
Heller & Nitschke, 1997). However, it is unknown whether these characteristic 
patterns of neural activity exist before psychopathology is experienced, and if they do 
whether they are a marker of stress sensitivity. As such, the present thesis investigated 
the frontal asymmetry by parietal asymmetry interaction as a predictor of depression, 
both directly and within the diathesis-stress model. Vulnerability to depression may 
be characterised by a combination of rightward frontal asymmetry and low right 
parietal activity. 
Spontaneous emotion regulation. A core aspect of depression is the failure to 
habitually and effectively regulate emotions as they occur and are experienced 
(Jazaieri, Urry, & Gross, 2013). Failing to effectively engage regulatory processes 
when an emotional response is experienced leads to prolonged responses, and may 
constitute a vulnerability to depression (Ehring, Tuschen-Caffier, Schnülle, Fischer, & 
Gross, 2010). To date most research examining emotion regulation in experimental 
contexts has assessed instructed regulation, that is, the ability to use a particular 
strategy when asked to do so. Most studies of this type have assessed ability to use 
cognitive reappraisal (the reframing of an emotional experience to be more positive or 
negative; see Aldao et al., 2010). The use of instructed reappraisal maintains good 
experimental control. However, despite evidence that cognitive reappraisal is a 
beneficial strategy (e.g. Troy, Wilhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2010), it is not as 
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commonly drawn upon in real world contexts as was previously assumed (Suri et al., 
2014). This may be because cognitive reappraisal ability is impaired under stress 
(Raio et al., 2013). Additionally, cognitive reappraisal is one of many possible 
regulation strategies, and individuals are likely to draw upon a variety of techniques, 
or use multiple techniques in conjunction, to regulate emotion in their day-to-day 
lives (Heiy & Chavens, 2014). Evidence that dysphoric (Quigley & Dobson, 2013) 
and previously depressed (Ehring et al., 2010) individuals are as capable as healthy 
controls of reappraisal when instructed, despite little tendency to do so spontaneously, 
suggests that instructed reappraisal may not be the best process to target when 
investigating emotion regulation as a vulnerability marker of depression. The 
distinction between regulation capability and tendency (see Berkman & Leiberman, 
2009) highlights the utility of examining spontaneous regulation of responses to 
emotional challenge - that is the outcome of participant’s own habitual, undirected, 
regulation attempts - as a measure of the use of regulation strategies in a flexible and 
adaptive way.  
Objective measures of spontaneous regulation can be obtained in laboratory 
based experimental paradigms by presenting emotional challenges (e.g. emotional 
images) and using objective measures (e.g. psychophysiological responses) to track 
emotional reactivity both during and after the emotional challenge. By letting 
participants respond and regulate of their own volition (i.e., not requesting that 
particular strategies or approaches be employed) an objective measure of their 
tendency to habitually regulate emotions can be obtained (Davidson, 1998). 
Psychophysiological indicators of emotional response and spontaneous regulation are 
particularly useful as they are able to track the dynamics of emotional reactivity 
across time without requiring introspective subjective reports. 
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One method for measuring both emotional responses and spontaneous emotion 
regulation is the startle eye-blink reflex (e.g Dillion & LaBar, 2005; Driscoll, Tranel, 
& Anderson, 2009; Jackson, Malmstadt, Larson, & Davidson, 2000). The startle eye-
blink is an innate behavioural response to a sudden and intense sensory stimulus, such 
as a loud noise. It is a component of an organism-wide startle reflex, which is 
automatic and adaptive (it protects the eyes from damage).  It can be measured non-
invasively by placing electrodes on the skin over the orbicularis oculi muscle, which 
is responsible for reflexive closure of the eyelid (Blumenthal et al., 2005). 
Importantly, when the parameters of the stimulus eliciting the startle (e.g. sound 
intensity) are held constant, blink magnitudes can be modulated by the emotional 
valence of an additional stimulus (e.g., an image). While it is the intense sensory 
stimulus that causes the blink, it is the nature of the additional foreground stimulus 
that modulates the magnitude of the blink. Relative to neutral stimuli, concurrent 
processing of unpleasant stimuli leads to larger blink magnitudes, and processing of 
pleasant stimuli leads to smaller blink magnitudes (Bradley, Cuthbert & Lang, 1999).  
In a typical affective startle paradigm, brief (50ms), intense bursts of white-
noise (~90-110dB) are used to initiate the startle eye-blink response. Stationary 
emotional images are frequently used to modulate the startle response. Emotional 
images (e.g., an attacking dog) present an emotional challenge to an individual, and 
are useful as they allow experimenters to have control over the stimuli, particularly in 
terms of content and duration of exposure. White-noise bursts are presented to probe 
the emotional response while participants view an emotional stimulus (see Bradley et 
al., 1999). Electromyography (EMG) electrodes are positioned over the orbicularis 
oculi muscles so that electrical activity, produced by action potentials within the 
muscle, can be recorded. The magnitude of this electrical activity reflects the response 
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to the noise probe, modulated (either up or down) by the emotional reactivity the 
participant is experiencing at the time of the probe. 
Distinct patterns of startle eye-blink responses are observed depending on when 
(relative to the emotional stimulus onset) the noise probe is presented and the arousal 
and valence properties of the foreground image (Bradley, Codispoti & Lang, 2006; 
Dicther, Tomarken, & Baucom, 2002). These patterns of responding are shown in 
Figure 1.1. In a typical startle eye-blink paradigm participants passively view images. 
Patterns of emotional response across time can then be obtained by presenting the 
startle probe at different time points after the onset of the image. Image-probe 
latencies are divided into three distinct response periods to indicate emotional 
responses across time; early, late, and post-image startle response periods.  
0.3 4 7 15
Startle Probe Latency from Image Onset (seconds) 
Pleasant
Neutral
Unpleasant
Figure 1.1 Idealised depiction of the time course of startle responses to emotional images. The 
typical pattern of startle responses to noise probes are represented at four latencies from onset of an 
emotional image (image presented from 0 to 6 seconds). The 0.3s probe depicts the orienting 
response and the 4s probe depicts modulation of the startle response by emotional valence. The 
probe at 7s (1s post-image) shows dissipation of emotional reactivity and at 15s (baseline probe) 
shows responding in the absence of any foreground stimuli. 
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The early response period is maximal approximately 300 milliseconds after 
stimulus onset and is considered to reflect the allocation of attentional resources to 
high arousal images, regardless of valence (Bradley et al., 2012). Probes presented 
300ms from image onset occur during early processing of the image and produce 
attenuation of startle blinks (a reduction in magnitude) for high arousal (positive or 
negative) images relative to low arousal images (Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1993). 
During this early phase of processing, high arousal information is detected as 
potentially important and attentional resources are recruited to determine the stimuli’s 
relevance. Responses to startle probes are attenuated for high arousal images due to 
the gating of sensory inputs, thus protecting attentional processing of the important 
emotional stimulus (see Filion, Dawson, & Schell, 1998). High arousal images 
produce more attenuation as they inherently contain biologically relevant information 
and thus engage more attentional resources, leaving fewer resources to process the 
startle probe. This early probe time reflects the arousal-sensitive orienting stage of the 
emotional response, as outlined in the multi-process model (see Bradley et al., 2012). 
The late response period typically begins 1.5 seconds after stimulus onset, 
peaking between 3 and 4 seconds from onset, and may extend until image removal 
(typically 5 to 8 seconds). Responses during this period are modulated by the valence 
of the image and reflect activation of defensive and appetitive motivational systems 
(Bradley et al., 2006). Relative to neutral stimuli, blink magnitudes are attenuated by 
pleasant stimuli and potentiated by unpleasant stimuli (Bradley, Cutherbert, & Lang, 
1999). The magnitude of these effects increases as the arousal of stimuli increases 
(Bradley et al., 1999; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). Startle modulation at this 
time point is highly robust (Lang et al., 1990), and is thus used as a reliable measure 
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of valanced emotional responses during the motivational priming stage of responding 
(as outlined by the multi-process model).  
The post-image startle response is measured during the period directly after an 
image has been removed and reflects ongoing emotional processing related to the 
removed stimulus. Therefore this probe point reflects whether a response has been 
regulated (i.e., blink magnitude does not differ by the valence of previous foreground 
stimulus) or is ongoing (i.e., blink magnitude is still modulated by previous 
foreground stimulus). This time point is used to measure emotion regulation (e.g. 
Jackson et al., 2003) and when no instruction to regulate is given reflects spontaneous 
emotion regulation. Post-image reactivity has been measured anywhere from 300ms 
to 6 seconds after stimulus removal (e.g. Bradley et al., 1993; Bradley et al., 2006; 
Ditcher, Tomarken & Baucom, 2002; Jackson, Muller, Dolski, Dalton, Nitschke, Urry 
et al., 2003; Larson, Nitschke, & Davidson, 2007; Larson, Ruffalo, Nietert, & 
Davidson, 2005; Larson, Taubitz & Robinson, 2010; Taubitz, Robinson & Larson, 
2013). As images used in laboratory experiments are relatively low intensity 
emotional stimuli (compared to emotional stimuli encountered in the real world) the 
elicited emotion is relatively transient, and reactivity rapidly degrades after images 
are removed. For example, emotional responses to an actual threatening stimulus 
(e.g., coming across a snake in the wild) may be expected to go on for much longer 
periods of time than for images, and require more intensive regulation (Bradley et al., 
1999). Therefore, post-image probes are often presented soon after image removal. 
Individuals differ in the rate at which emotion is regulated and the degree to 
which they successfully regulate emotion (Gross, 2013). The regulation of emotion 
can be tapped using the startle eye-blink reflex by indexing the amount of emotional 
reactivity present after an emotional stimulus is removed relative to reactivity after a 
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neutral stimulus is removed. During the post-image period (e.g., one second post 
offset) more reactivity indicates less emotion regulation and less reactivity indicates 
more regulation. When compared to responses following a neutral stimulus, better 
emotion regulators would be expected to show less startle potentiation following the 
removal of a negative emotional stimulus (indicating reduced activation of defensive 
motivational systems) and poorer emotion regulators would be expected to show more 
potentiation (indicating ongoing activation of defensive motivation systems; e.g. 
Dichter et al., 2002; Jackson et al., 2003; Larson et al., 2010; Larson et al., 2007; 
Taubitz et al., 2013). Thus, probes at this post-image point are considered to be 
sensitive to individual differences in ability to regulate emotional responses. 
The startle eye-blink has been used to explore the relationship between 
emotional reactivity (both response during image presentation and regulation after 
image offset) and depression. The typical arousal-based pattern of response has been 
reported at the early response phase for depressed individuals (Dichter et al., 2004), 
indicated that they show normal attention to emotional images. However, during the 
late response period clinically depressed individuals consistently show no startle 
modulation by emotional valence, as seen in controls (Allen, Trinder, & Brennan, 
1999; Dichter & Tomarken, 2008; Dichter, Tomarken, Shelton & Sutton, 2004; 
Kavani, Gray, Checkley, Raven, Wilson, & Kumari, 2004). No studies have reported 
post-image startle reactivity for a clinically depressed population. Subclinical 
populations have also been assessed using the startle eye-blink paradigm but with 
mixed findings. For example, at the late emotion response period subclinical 
individuals (who score high on scales of depressive symptoms), have been found to 
show patterns of typical modulation (Larson et al., 2007), reduced modulation 
(Taubitz et al., 2013), and no modulation (Mneimne, McDeremut, & Powers, 2008) 
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by emotion valence.  Post-image probes have also shown mixed findings for 
subclinical individuals. One study found they did not differ from controls (Larson et 
al., 2007) and another found sustained potentiation following unpleasant images for 
those with higher depressive symptoms (Taubitz et al., 2013).  
Particularly relevant to the current study, markers of vulnerability to depression 
(as opposed to current depression) have been related to post-image startle responses 
(Jackson et al., 2003; Larson et al., 2010). Both of these studies show typical emotion 
modulation by valence at the late probe but at the post-image probe have shown that 
individuals possessing a neurobiological marker (rightward frontal asymmetry; 
Jackson et al., 2003) or a genetic marker (the G-allele of the monoamine oxidase A 
gene; Larson et al., 2010) of depression show sustained potentiation following 
unpleasant images, indicating poorer spontaneous emotion regulation for those more 
vulnerable to depression. No studies have examined the relationship between 
vulnerability and the early response probe. Additionally, no prospective research has 
examined a startle eye-blink index of spontaneous emotion regulation, either as a 
direct predictor of depression, or as a moderator of the stress-depression relationship.   
Brooding rumination. Rumination is a cognitive response style to stress that 
involves the tendency to repeatedly focus on and mull over the negative aspects of a 
stressful situation or sequence of events (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008). People who ruminate typically employ this strategy as an attempt to cope with 
negative emotional responses (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). However, rumination 
may be a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy that actually increases negative 
mood and disrupts potentially beneficial regulation strategies (Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 
2004; Spendelow & Jose, 2012; Ward, Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2003). Trait rumination is typically assessed using self-report measures, and it has 
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been shown to be related to poorer outcomes in multiple aspects of individuals’ lives 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Siegle, Moore & Thase 2004), including less adaptive 
responses to stress (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), and a more chronic course of 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema & Murrow, 1991).  
Rumination is a robust predictor of depression (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Ciesla 
& Roberts, 2007; Mezulis, Simonson, McCauley, & Vender Stoep, 2011; Treynor, 
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) and as a trait it remains relatively stable across 
time despite changes in depressive symptoms (Bagby, Rector, Bacchiochi, & 
McBride, 2004). This level of stability indicates that it is an emotion regulation trait 
rather than symptomatic of depression itself. Longitudinal studies have shown 
ruminative response styles to be both a mediator (Jose & Brown, 2008; Michl 
McLaughlin, Shepard, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013) and moderator (Abela & Hankin, 
2011) of the stress depression relationship. 
A common measure of rumination, the Ruminative Response Scale (Treynor et 
al., 2003) has been found to tap three types of rumination: depression related 
rumination, which was found to be highly confounded with depression; reflective 
rumination, which is associated with adaptive and helpful cognitive thoughts about 
stressful events; and brooding rumination, which is the problematic aspect of 
rumination. Brooding is the tendency to dwell on the self-referential negative 
consequences of a situation (e.g., “why me” type thoughts), while reflection is the 
tendency to consider and understand a situation (Treynor et al., 2003). Brooding and 
reflection both show a positive relationship with depression (Joormann, Dkane, & 
Gotlib, 2006; Treynor et al., 2003). However, a longitudinal examination has shown 
brooding to correlate positively with future depressive symptoms and reflecting to 
correlate negatively with future depression symptoms (Treynor et al., 2003). 
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Therefore, while reflection may relate to distress in the short term it may also aid 
successful problem solving in the long term. On the other hand, brooding does not 
appear to be related to successful problem solving (Treynor et al., 2003). Brooding 
rumination has also been associated with an attentional bias toward negative 
information, while controlling for depression (Joormann et al., 2006), indicating that 
brooding reflects a tendency to focus on negative events independently of the 
influence of depression. Brooding may also act as a diathesis, as it has been shown to 
moderate the stress-depression relationship, such that individuals who report a greater 
tendency to draw on a brooding coping style also show worse depressive symptoms 
when encountering stress (Bastin, Mezulis, Ahles, Raes & Bijttebier, 2014; Cox, 
Funasaki, Smith, & Mezulis, 2011, Jose, Kramer & Hou, 2014; but also see Paredes 
& Zumalde, 2014). Therefore, brooding rumination is considered to be a trait measure 
of emotion regulation that acts as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress model. As 
such, it may reflect a common underlying vulnerability to depression as measured by 
regional EEG activity and spontaneous emotion regulation. 
Summary 
In the current thesis I will test three very different trait measures of emotion 
regulation – regional EEG activity, spontaneous emotion regulation, and brooding 
rumination – within the diathesis-stress model. In Study One, I measure these emotion 
regulation traits in a population of young women and test whether they reflect the 
same or different manifestations of an underlying vulnerability to depression. As 
studies have largely examined these emotion regulation trait measures within 
independent lines of research, it remains unclear whether these are different 
manifestations of the same underlying vulnerability or whether they are each tapping 
into independent vulnerability markers for depression. In Study Two and Study Three, 
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I prospectively test these trait measures of emotion regulation within the diathesis-
stress model at a short term (three month) follow-up for Study Two, and a longer term 
(twelve month) follow-up for Study Three. Stress and depression are measured at time 
two and again at time three and the trait measures of emotion regulation (measured at 
time one) are used to predict changes in depression symptoms at each following time 
point. This design enables the different emotion regulation markers and life stress to 
be tested as direct predictors of depression (i.e, do one or all of these measures predict 
depression at the follow-up time points). Importantly, the interaction between emotion 
regulation measures and life stress can also be tested at each follow-up time point. In 
other words, the three month and twelve month follow-up measures of life stress and 
depression, in conjunction with the time one measures of emotion regulation, allow 
trait emotion regulation to be directly tested within the diathesis-stress model. If one, 
two or all of the emotion regulation measures act as a diathesis within the diathesis-
stress framework, emotion regulation would be expected to interact with life stress 
such that poorer emotion regulators would be expected to show increases in 
depression symptoms when they experience life stress, whereas good emotion 
regulators would be expected to be less sensitive to changes in depressive symptoms 
when they experience life stress. 
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Chapter Two 
Study One: Relationships Among Trait Emotion Regulation Measures 
The aim of Study One was to test the relationship between three different trait 
measures of emotion regulation; that is, the degree to which regional EEG activity 
(frontal and parietal asymmetries), spontaneous emotion regulation (as measured by 
the startle eye-blink reflex), and brooding rumination reflect different manifestations 
of the same underlying vulnerability to depression or are independent of one another. 
For example, EEG asymmetries may reflect the neural substrates that control 
spontaneous emotion regulation, which in turn may reflect individual ruminative 
coping styles. Alternatively, one or all of the proposed diatheses may reflect 
independent trait vulnerabilities. Very few studies have examined the relationships 
between pairs of these variables but, as described below, there is evidence to suggest 
they may be related (e.g. Jackson et al., 2003; Key, Campbell, Bacon, & Gerin, 2008; 
Nusslock et al., 2011; Ray, Ochsner & Cooper, 2005; Tomarken & Davidson, 1994). 
However, no studies have directly tested the relationship between these three trait 
emotion regulation measures in one study. An in-depth analysis of the relationships 
between these three trait markers of emotion regulation will lead to a more 
comprehensive understanding of vulnerability to depression and establish whether the 
independent lines of research that have investigated these phenomena are tapping the 
same or different underlying mechanisms.  
Regional EEG Activity and Spontaneous Emotion Regulation 
It has been proposed that more leftward frontal asymmetry is related to 
individual tendencies to effectively regulate negative emotional responses and more 
rightward asymmetry is related to ineffective regulation tendencies (for more 
information see Coan, Allen, & McKnight, 2006; Davidson, 2004; Gable, Mechin, 
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Hicks, & Adams, 2015; Grimshaw & Carmel, 2014). Jackson and colleagues (2003) 
tested this hypothesis empirically. In a sample of 47 people they examined the 
relationship between frontal EEG asymmetries and startle eye-blink measures of 
emotional reactivity during (at 2.5 and 4.5 seconds after picture onset) and after (1 
second post-image offset) passive viewing of negative images compared to neutral 
images. Probes presented during picture viewing were used to measure the emotional 
response to the picture, and probes presented after picture offset were used to index 
spontaneous emotion regulation (sustained emotion reactivity after picture offset). 
They found that emotional reactivity following offset of negative images correlated 
with frontal asymmetry measures, such that more rightward frontal asymmetry scores 
were associated with increased emotional reactivity (i.e., more potentiation following 
negative images relative to neutral images) when compared to those with more 
leftward asymmetry. This indicated that those with a more rightward frontal 
asymmetry showed sustained emotional processing of negative images, and were thus 
less successful at spontaneously regulating their emotional response. It should be 
noted, however, that the correlations Jackson and colleagues (2003) found between 
frontal asymmetry and spontaneous emotion regulation were at frontal-pole (FP2-
FP1) and frontal-central (FC4-FC3) electrode sites, but asymmetries have been most 
frequently related to depression at frontal-medial (F4-F3) and frontal-lateral (F7-F8) 
sites (see Coan & Allen, 2004). Jackson and colleagues also explored the relationship 
between parietal asymmetry and emotion regulation but found that these measures did 
not correlate. In sum, Jackson and colleagues’ (2003) findings support the notion that 
resting frontal asymmetries reflect spontaneous emotion regulation ability, suggesting 
that these two trait markers may in fact be different manifestations of the same 
underlying vulnerability to depression (see Davidson, 1998).  
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Jackson and colleagues’ (2003) findings have been extremely influential. They 
provided support to Davidson’s (2004; 1998) model - that rightward frontal 
asymmetry may be linked to less adaptive emotion processing (and thus predict 
vulnerability to depression) - and has stimulated much research on frontal asymmetry 
and emotion related processes (e.g., Kim, Cornwell, & Kim, 2012; Miskovic, 
Schmidt, Georgiades, Boyle, & MacMillan, 2009; Moran, Mehta, & Kring, 2012). 
However, in the twelve years since their results were reported, there have been no 
published replications, and a search on PsychInfo shows 197 citations (as of March 
2015). In order to usefully guide theory and future research, such an influential 
finding requires replication.  
Brooding Rumination and Spontaneous Emotion Regulation 
Studies examining startle reactivity following the removal of emotional image 
have found mixed findings (Bradley et al., 1993; Bradley et al., 2006; Dichter et al., 
2002; Jackson et al., 2003; Larson et al., 2007; Larson et al., 2005; Larson et al., 
2010; Taubitz et al., 2013). Ditcher and colleagues (2002) examined the time course 
of startle reactivity to emotional images post-image removal and found that startle 
responses did not differ by image (also see Bradley et al., 1993; Bradley et al., 2006). 
They speculated that individual differences in cognitive coping styles such as 
rumination might be linked to startle response measures of spontaneous emotion 
regulation. However, their study was not designed to examine individual differences, 
and no direct evidence for their proposal has yet been reported. Nonetheless, other 
physiological measures of sustained emotional processing have been related to 
rumination. For example, higher levels of rumination have been related to larger skin 
conductance responses following negative feedback (Rossi & Pourtois, 2014); 
sustained pupil dilation while viewing negative words (Siegle, Steinhauer, Carter, 
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Ramel & Thase, 2003); and prolonged cardiovascular recovery when asked to recall a 
stressful life event (Key et al., 2008). Taken together, these findings indicate that 
ruminative coping styles are associated with prolonged physiological recovery to 
emotional events, and I propose that the startle reflex may also tap into these 
processes. Based on this assumption, it is plausible that spontaneous emotion 
regulation (as indexed by the startle eye-blink) is reflective of the same underlying 
process as brooding rumination.  
Brooding Rumination and Regional EEG Activity 
Frontal EEG asymmetries have been proposed to reflect the neural substrates of 
ruminative response styles (Reid, Duke, & Allen, 1998). Independent studies of both 
brooding rumination and rightward frontal asymmetry have shown each to predict 
future depression (e.g. Mezulis et al., 2011; Nusslock et al., 2011). Thus, it might be 
expected that higher levels of brooding rumination would be related to more 
rightward frontal asymmetries. However, when considered in the context of theories 
of frontal asymmetry this relationship may not be so clear (see Reid et al., 1998). 
Davidson (2004; also see Harmon-Jones, 2010) proposes that rightward frontal 
asymmetries reflect trait tendencies to engage in withdrawal behaviours, whereas 
leftward frontal asymmetries reflect trait tendencies to engage in approach-related 
behaviours. While rumination does involve withdrawal from the current external 
context, and thus could potentially be reflected by rightward frontal asymmetries, it 
also involves internal verbal processes and is an attempt to actively cope with 
(approach) problems. As such, it is also conceivable that brooding rumination could 
be related to leftward frontal asymmetries (see Heller & Nitschke, 1998; Heller & 
Nitscke, 1997). Although almost no studies to date have assessed the relationship 
between frontal EEG and brooding rumination directly, one study found that higher 
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trait rumination (not brooding rumination) correlated with more rightward frontal 
asymmetry scores in a population with no current or previous depression diagnosis 
(Nusslock et al., 2011). While this one study supports the proposal that brooding 
rumination is related to withdrawal processes, it remains to be thoroughly explored 
whether trait brooding rumination is reflected in resting frontal asymmetries, and if 
so, whether it relates to leftward or rightward asymmetries.  
Study One 
The primary aim of Study One was to explore relationships among three trait 
measures of emotion regulation - regional EEG activity, spontaneous regulation as 
indexed by the startle eye-blink, and self-reported brooding rumination. Startle eye-
blink probes were presented at four different time points. Two time points measured 
emotional responses during the image. The first was an early emotional response 
probe (the early probe), presented at 300 milliseconds from image onset and used to 
measure attentional allocation to images. The second was a late response probe 
presented at four seconds after image onset, used to measure emotional modulation by 
valence. A third probe, presented one second after picture offset, measured ongoing 
emotional reactivity as an indicator of spontaneous emotion regulation. And finally, a 
fourth probe was included 8 – 10 seconds after image offset to measure baseline 
responses to probes (i.e., startle reflexes in the absence of emotional stimuli.) 
 Participants were women between 18 and 24 years of age, with no history of 
depression (previous or current). No previous diagnosis of depression was an 
important selection criterion for two reasons. First, the diathesis-stress model defines 
vulnerability as existing prior to an episode of depression (Willner et al., 2013). 
Second, the role of stress in the onset of depression changes as the number of 
experienced episodes increases (Willner et al., 2013; Post, 1992). Therefore, 
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individuals with a history of depression are likely to display a different relationship 
between stress and depression than individuals without a history of depression. Young 
adults are in a transitional developmental period that often involves significant 
changes in context and social support systems (Schulenberg, Sameroff, & Cicchetti, 
2004) and such changes are likely to include elevated prevalence of negative events 
and high levels of distress (Arnett, 1998; Schulenberg et al., 2004). Also, many young 
adults are likely to possess risk factors for depression (vulnerability) but are yet to 
experience a depressive episode (Pettit, Hartley, Lewinsohn, Seeley & Klein, 2013). 
These factors make young adults a good population in which to study factors that 
predict future depression. 
Women were exclusively recruited because depression manifests differently for 
men and women (Hankin & Abramson, 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001) and thus 
vulnerability factors are likely to differ. Also, prevalence of depression is twice as 
high for women than men, so examining diatheses in women only should increase the 
likelihood of seeing changes in depression symptoms across time. Selecting young 
women maintained a more homogeneous sample and therefore maximized power to 
detect predicted relationships.  Additionally, rumination is a more prevalent cognitive 
coping style for young women than for men (Jose & Brown, 2008; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2001; Johnson & Whisman, 2013; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003), and frontal EEG asymmetries have been observed to be a reliable 
predictor of depression for women (Thibodeau et al., 2006), but this relationship may 
be less robust for men (Stewart, Bismark, Towers, Coan, & Allen, 2010; Stewart et 
al., 2011). Therefore, while the question of vulnerability to depression in men is 
important, it was beyond the scope of the current study.  
Hypotheses 
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Startle modulation.  
1. The early probe: The early probe time point was included as an exploratory 
measure to investigate whether early attentional allocation to emotional images (in 
addition to spontaneous emotion regulation) relates to established factors vulnerability 
to depression (i.e., regional EEG activity and brooding rumination). Responses to 
early startle probes reflect allocation of attention to high-arousal emotional material; 
more attenuation of the startle eye-blink indicates increased attentional allocation to 
the foreground stimulus (Bradley et al 2003). Therefore, it was expected that, relative 
to neutral responses, startle responses would be attenuated to both positive and 
negative high arousal images.  
2. The late probe: Late emotion response probes measure differential emotional 
response by image valence and served as a manipulation check to ensure that 
emotional modulation of the startle eye-blink was attained by the images. In line with 
typical emotional modulation of the startle response (Bradley et al., 2006), it was 
expected that startle responses at the late probe time point would show, relative to 
neutral images, potentiation in the presence of unpleasant images and attenuation in 
the presence of pleasant images.  
3. The post-image probe: Post-image startle responses were not expected to differ by 
image valence at the group level, as emotional responding was expected to have 
dissipated by this point. However, individual differences in post-image potentiation 
indexes spontaneous emotion regulation. Therefore, individual differences in post-
image potentiation were expected to interact with the other proposed trait measures of 
emotion regulation, all thought to indicate vulnerability to depression. Predictions for 
this time point are outlined below in the section labeled trait measures of emotion 
regulation.  
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Trait measures of emotion regulation. 
Regional EEG activity and spontaneous emotion regulation: If spontaneous 
emotion regulation and patterns of regional EEG activity are different manifestations 
of the same underlying process, then regional EEG activity should predict 
spontaneous regulation. However, if these are independent vulnerability markers no 
such relationship should be observed. Davidson’s (1998) model proposes that 
rightward frontal asymmetry reflects vulnerability to depression. Similarly, larger 
post-image emotion reactivity is proposed to reflect vulnerability to depression 
(Davidson, 1998). Thus, in line with the findings of Jackson and colleagues (2003), it 
was predicted that frontal EEG asymmetries would correlate with post-image 
emotional reactivity such that individuals with a more rightward asymmetry would 
show more emotional reactivity (more potentiation relative to neutral images) after 
negative images were removed than individuals with a more leftward asymmetry.  
Recent evidence indicates that rather than examining frontal asymmetries in 
isolation, looking at the interaction between frontal and parietal asymmetry may 
provide a more comprehensive measure of emotional processing (Grimshaw, Foster, 
& Corballis, 2014). According to Heller’s Circumplex model (1993) low right parietal 
activity and rightward frontal asymmetry are the underlying EEG manifestations 
reflecting vulnerability to depression. Thus, parietal and frontal EEG measures may 
interact in the current study such that low right parietal activity and rightward frontal 
asymmetry predict more startle potentiation after negative images, whereas low right 
parietal activity and leftward frontal asymmetry predict less startle potentiation. 
Brooding rumination and spontaneous emotion regulation. If post-image 
emotion reactivity is tapping into ongoing ruminative processes, as proposed by 
Ditcher and colleagues (2002), higher brooding rumination scores are expected to 
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positively correlate with sustained emotion reactivity as indicated by enhanced post-
image reactivity.  
Brooding rumination and EEG activity. Predictions for the relationship 
between regional EEG activity and brooding rumination are uncertain. If verbal and 
approach behaviours are reflected in brooding rumination (Reid et al., 1998), then 
greater brooding rumination is expected to relate to leftward frontal asymmetry. 
However, if brooding rumination reflects an individual’s withdrawal from his or her 
current context, brooding rumination should relate to rightward frontal asymmetry. 
Method 
Participants 
The study was approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the School of 
Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington. One hundred and fifty four 
undergraduate women participated in the first experimental session. All were aged 18 
to 24 years and reported that they were right-handed with no history of neurological 
disorder. Participants who reported a previous diagnosis of depression or anxiety (n = 
34) were removed. A further five participants were removed due to equipment failure 
or experimenter error. This attrition resulted in a total of 115 participants (MAGE = 
18.90 years; SDAGE = 1.33) for Study One analysis.  
Stimuli and Apparatus 
Seventy-two images (24 pleasant, 24 neutral and 24 unpleasant), covering a 
variety of emotion categories, were selected from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS) based on standardised female ratings for arousal and valence (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008; see Appendix A). Standard arousal ratings differed 
significantly between pleasant (M = 6.33, SD = .61) and neutral (M = 2.55, SD = .35) 
images, t(46) = 26.20, p < .001; between unpleasant (M = 7.26, SD = .27) and neutral 
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images, t(46) = 51.83, p < .001; and between pleasant and unpleasant images, t(46) = 
-6.80, p < .001
1
. Standard valence ratings differed between pleasant (M = 7.55, SD = 
.52) and neutral (M = 4.98, SD = .15) images, t(46) = 23.14, p < .001, between 
unpleasant (M = 1.43, SD = .21) and neutral images, t(46) = -65.03, p < .001, and 
between pleasant and unpleasant images, t(46) = 52.93, p < .001.  
All stimuli and questionnaires were presented using Psychology Software 
Tools’ E-prime version 1.1 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) running on a 
Dell Optiplex 760 computer with a Dell 1908FPb 19” LCD monitor (1024 x 768 
pixels, 60Hz refresh rate). Acoustic startle probes were presented using Sony MDR-
V150 headphones. These probes comprised 50ms of white noise with near 
instantaneous rise time and a sound pressure level of 95dB. 
Questionnaire Measures  
All questionnaires were adapted for presentation by E-prime and were presented 
on the same computer used for stimulus presentation. Participants completed the 
following questionnaires: 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II). The (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) was used to assess current symptoms of depression (see Appendix B). The 
BDI-II consists of 21 items with four response alternatives and participants endorse 
the alternative that best describes how they have felt during the previous two weeks. 
Each alternative carries a value between 0 and 3, reflecting progressively more 
depression symptomology, for example, item 1: “(0) I do not feel sad; (1) I feel sad; 
(2) I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it; (3) I am so sad and unhappy that I 
can’t stand it”. Responses are summed to provide a total inventory score between 0-
                                                        
1 Positive images were included to provide a manipulation check for modulation of 
the startle effect by valence and were not of interest in the current thesis with regards 
to measures of emotion regulation. For this reason images were not equated for 
arousal 
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63. The BDI is a widely used measure of depression symptomology for both clinical 
assessment and research purposes (Hill and Lambert, 2004). It has good reliability 
and validity in psychiatric and non-psychiatric populations (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 
1988) and also in a population of young adults attending university (Storch, Roberti, 
& Roth, 2004). 
Ruminitive Response Scale (RRS). Brooding rumination was measured using 
the brooding subscale from the Ruminative Response Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991). The RRS is a 22 item scale (see Appendix C) in which participants 
report the typical thoughts they experience when they are sad or depressed. Ratings 
are made for each item on a 4-point Likert scale, from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost 
always), to indicate the degree to which they endorse each item. The brooding 
subscale (Treynor et al., 2003) consists of five of these items related to maladaptive 
thoughts about the desired situations (e.g. “When you feel down sad or depressed do 
you think “what am I doing to deserve this”).  Total scores for the brooding subscale 
range from 5 to 20 with higher scores indicating higher levels of brooding 
Procedure  
Participants were shown around the EEG laboratory, and briefed on the 
procedure, before they provided written informed consent. Following this, the EEG 
cap and EMG electrodes were fitted. The experimental session consisted of three 
phases completed consecutively and always in the same order. First, eight minutes of 
resting EEG was recorded. Second, the startle eye-blink paradigm was presented in 
which participants passively viewed images on the monitor while the startle probes 
were presented over headphones. This was directly followed by a ‘washout’ period 
during which participants rested for five minutes while listening to relaxing music. 
Third, they completed the depression BDI and RRS questionnaires. The entire 
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experiment was completed in a dimly lit, sound-attenuated, and electrically-shielded 
chamber. Participants sat in a comfortable chair approximately one meter from the 
monitor. Instructions were given to remain still and avoid excessive blinking or eye 
movements during all EEG and EMG recording phases.  
Once participants were comfortable, the eight minutes of resting EEG was 
recorded. This phase was divided into four blocks of two minutes, two with eyes open 
(O) and two with eyes closed (C), the order of which was counterbalanced across 
participants (either O-C-C-O or C-O-O-C). Participants then performed a passive 
picture-viewing task while EMG was recorded. They were told that emotional images 
would appear on the screen and that they should watch these images for the entire 
time they were present, while ignoring the noises that would come through the 
headphones. Each trial (see Figure 2.1 for a schematic of the trial procedure) started 
with the onset of an IAPS image (6 second duration), which filled the entire monitor. 
A blank screen was presented after each image for a variable ISI between 12 and 14 
seconds. Startle probes were presented at one of four possible time points during each 
trial: after 300 milliseconds, 4 seconds, 7 seconds (1 second after image offset) or 14-
16 seconds (8-10 seconds from image offset). The 14-16 second probe time was 
included to provide a baseline measure of startle responding (i.e., startle responses 
when no stimulus was present) and also served to reduce predictability of probe 
presentation with each image. A total of six startle probes were presented for each 
image category at each time point, and image valence and startle probe time were 
randomised from trial to trial. After the startle paradigm was complete participants 
were instructed to close their eyes and relax while listening to 5 minutes of relaxing 
music: the first 5 minutes of Beethoven’s Piano Concerto No. 5 “Emperor” II. Adagio 
un poco moto. This phase was designed to provide some time for potential arousal 
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effects induced by the startle experiment to dissipate. Participants then completed the 
questionnaires.  
 
Physiological data recording, reduction and analysis 
Electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was continuously recorded using a 
lycra Quik-Cap (Compumedics NeuroMedical Supplies) embedded with 30 Ag/AgCl 
electrodes (FP1, FP2, F7, F3, FZ, F4, F8, FT7, FC3, FCZ, FC4, FT8, T7, C3, CZ, C4, 
T8, TP7, CP3, CPZ, CP4, TP8, P7, P3, PZ, P4, P8, O1, OZ, and O2) arranged 
according to the 10-20 system. All channels were referenced online to physically 
linked mastoids (M1+M2). Each channel was sampled at 500Hz, using BrainAMP 
amplifiers and recorded using BrainVision Recorder software (BrainProducts GmBH, 
Gilching, Germany). Vertical and horizontal eye movements were measured via 
electro-oculogram (EOG) channels derived from electrodes placed above and below 
the left eye and lateral to each eye. All electrode impedances were below 10KΩ.  
EEG data were processed offline using BrainVision Analyzer software 
(BrainProducts GmBH, Gilching, Germany). EEG signals were filtered using a notch 
  
38 
filter at 50Hz, a high pass filter at 0.01Hz and a low pass filter at 30Hz.  Each two 
minute block was divided into 1.024 second epochs with 50% overlap, using a 
Hamming window of 10%. Raw power for each electrode was subjected to a Fast 
Fourier Transform (FFT) then averaged across all epochs. Alpha power (8-13Hz) was 
then extracted. Epochs including blinks were not removed as blinks have been shown 
to have minimal influence on asymmetries derived from alpha power (Hagemann, 
2004); this allowed the number of epochs to remain similar across all participants. 
Frontal and parietal asymmetry scores were derived from ln(F4)-ln(F3) and ln(P4)-
ln(P3), respectively (see Allen et al., 2004). For the frontal asymmetry index, more 
positive scores reflect a leftward frontal asymmetry and more negative scores reflect a 
rightward frontal asymmetry. Although positive parietal asymmetry values similarly 
reflect leftward asymmetry and negative values reflect rightward asymmetry, for 
theoretical reasons it can be useful to recast parietal asymmetry in terms of relative 
right parietal activity (see Heller & Nitschke, 1997). Thus negative parietal 
asymmetry scores reflect relatively high rightward parietal activity and positive scores 
reflect relatively low right parietal activity. 
Electromyographic (EMG) recording of startle eye-blinks was conducted 
according to the guidelines for human startle eye-blink set out by Blumenthal and 
colleagues (2005). Two 4mm (internal diameter) electrodes (Biopac Systems, Inc.) 
were placed over the orbicularis oculi muscle under the right eye. The first electrode 
was placed directly below the forward gazing pupil with the second placed 
approximately 10mm lateral to the first. Electrode impedances were kept below 
10kΩ. The EMG signal was filtered online with a high pass at 0.016Hz and a low pass 
at 1000Hz and amplified using BrainAMP amplifiers, then sampled at rate of 2500Hz, 
in order to obtain clear resolution of the EMG signal and avoid aliasing effects. The 
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signal was then recorded with BrainVision Recorder software (BrainProducts GmBH, 
Gilching, Germany).  
Further offline processing of the eye-blink EMG data was based on criteria set 
out by Bradley and colleagues (2006). The EMG signal was filtered with a digital 
band pass filter between 90Hz and 250Hz and a mains notch filter at 50Hz. The signal 
was then rectified and smoothed using a moving average filter with a time constant of 
123ms. Each blink was baseline zeroed across the interval covering 50ms before 
probe onset. Eye-blink magnitudes were scored as the peak voltages exceeding five 
standard deviations above baseline activity that occurred between 21ms and 180ms 
from probe onset. Trials where no blink was detected were scored as a zero response 
trial. Blinks were removed as artifacts if there was excessive noise in the EMG signal, 
movement during the baseline period, or if the blink criterion threshold was met 
before 20ms from probe onset (indicating a premature blink too early to be the result 
of the startle probe). Blinks with magnitudes more than three standard deviations 
above a participant’s mean were excluded. Due to large individual differences in 
magnitude, all blinks were standardized by z-transformation within participants then 
converted to T-scores. T-scores produce a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 for 
each participant. Thus, scores over 50 represent blinks larger than the participant’s 
mean and values below represent blinks smaller than the participant’s mean. 
Results 
The aim of this study was to test the relationships between the proposed trait 
measures of emotion regulation. However, in order to check that I achieved 
manipulation of emotional reactivity by emotional images, I first examined the time 
course of emotion reactivity to images, as indexed by startle eye-blink modulation. At 
the early probe attenuation was expected to high arousal images, regardless of 
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valence. The expected pattern of emotion reactivity at the late probe was potentiation 
to unpleasant images and attenuation to pleasant images, relative to neutral images. It 
was expected that (at the group level) emotion reactivity would have dissipated by 
one-second post-image offset. Therefore, no modulation by valence was expected at 
the post-image probe or at the baseline probe. After this manipulation check I tested 
whether vulnerability markers of depression were related to current depressive 
symptoms in this non-depressed sample. I then tested the key hypotheses of this 
study, - whether relationships exist among trait measures of emotion regulation 
(spontaneous emotion regulation, regional EEG activity, and brooding rumination).  
Startle Eye-Blink  
Standardised startle response magnitudes to probes were tested using a 4 (probe 
time: early, late, post-image, baseline) x 3 (valence: unpleasant, neutral, pleasant) 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Greenhouse-Geisser corrections 
for violations of sphericity were used where necessary. Figure 2.2 plots standardised 
magnitudes of startle responses during the three image trial types across the four time 
points. A significant main effect of probe time, F(3, 289) = 45.16, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .284, 
and a marginally significant main effect of valence, F(2, 228) = 2.73, p = .067, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.023, were qualified by a probe time by valence interaction, F(6, 586) = 2.26, p = 
.046, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .019. The main effect of probe time revealed the typical attenuation of 
startle probes relative to stimulus onset, with a graded increase over time (e.g. 
Bradley et al., 2006). To further explore the interaction of valence and probe time, 
effects of image valence on startle magnitude at each time point (early, late, and post-
image probes) were analysed in separate one-way ANOVAs.  
Attentional allocation. At the early probe the expected pattern of startle 
modulation is attenuation to both unpleasant and pleasant high arousal images relative 
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Figure 2.2. Standardised blink reflexes to startle probes during and after viewing emotional 
images.  
to neutral images. This pattern of response was not observed in this study. The follow 
up one-way ANOVA for the early probe time point showed a marginal linear effect 
of valence F(2, 228) = 2.456, p = .086. Follow up t-tests showed that startle 
magnitudes trended towards being larger for unpleasant images (M = 48.26, SD = 
5.042) than neutral (M = 47.37, SD = 2.89), t(114) = 1.83, p = .070, d = .217, and 
pleasant images (M = 47.29, SD = 3.97), t(114) = 1.76, p = .081, d = .214. Responses 
to pleasant and neutral images did not differ, t(114) = .185, p = .854. This pattern of 
potentiation to unpleasant images differs from the pattern of attenuation to both 
pleasant and unpleasant images that is typically seen 300ms from image onset. This 
suggests that these early responses did not tap attentional orienting to high arousal 
images as expected. 
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The late probe (manipulation check). Startle responses during the late phase 
of emotion image viewing typically show potentiation of eye-blinks to unpleasant 
images and attenuation to pleasant images. The follow up one-way ANOVA for the 
late time point showed a significant linear effect of valence F(2, 228) = 7.50, p = 
.001. Follow-up t-tests showed that startle responses to unpleasant images (M = 
51.25, SD = 4.21) were larger than those to pleasant images (M = 49.04, SD = 4.189), 
t(114) = 3.96, p < .001, d = .526, and marginally larger than those to neutral images 
(M = 50.15, SD = 3.86), t(114) = 1.88, p =  .062, d = .272. Also, responses for neutral 
images were marginally larger than responses for pleasant images, t(114) = 1.95, p = 
.054, d = .276. Results are in line with typical startle modulation by image valence at 
the late probe and show that modulation of the startle reflex by emotional images was 
achieved, with potentiation observed for unpleasant images and attenuation for 
pleasant images, relative to neutral images.  
Spontaneous emotion regulation.  No effects of valence were expected at this 
post-image probe time as it was proposed that, while individual differences in post-
image probe responses would reflect spontaneous emotion regulation, at the group 
level, emotional responses would have dissipated. The follow up one-way ANOVA 
confirmed that no differences in startle responses existed for the post-image probe, 
F(2, 228) = .845, p = .431. These results indicate that at the group level, the valence 
effects of the emotional images had dissipated after image offset.  
Baseline probe. No effect of valence was expected for the baseline probe. A 
follow up one-way ANOVA for responses at the baseline probe found no differences 
in startle responses at this time point, F(2, 228) = .089, p = .915. This finding 
indicates that valence of the preceding image had no effect on startle responses for 
probes presented at the baseline time point.  
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Summary of startle eye-blink findings. Analysis of startle eye-blink responses 
revealed typical potentiation by unpleasant images and attenuation by pleasant images 
at the late probe time point, thought to reflect priming of defensive and appetitive 
responding respectively. The post-image probe showed that this priming had 
dissipated one second after the image was removed, thought to reflect emotion 
regulation. However, the typical effect was not observed in the early time point 
(attenuation to both unpleasant and pleasant images), indicating that the early probe 
did not successfully tap attentional orienting to the emotional images as intended. 
Startle modulation metric. Although the startle eye-blink paradigm revealed 
expected effects of emotional reactivity and regulation at a group level, individual 
differences in these processes are of key importance for understanding vulnerability to 
depression. For the purposes of correlating emotional modulation of startle responses 
with other variables, an unpleasant reactivity measure was calculated. Startle eye-
blink responses to neutral images were subtracted from responses to negative images 
at the early, late and post-image time points. For this reactivity metric, positive values 
reflect potentiation of the startle response and negative values reflect attenuation. All 
following analyses involving startle eye-blink responses use this emotion reactivity 
metric.  
Trait Measures of Emotion Regulation and Depressive Symptoms 
All three trait measures of emotion regulation (EEG asymmetry, online emotion 
regulation, and self-reported brooding) are hypothesised vulnerabilities to depression. 
Therefore, I first tested whether they were related to depressive symptoms in this non-
clinical population. BDI-II scores evidenced a strong positive correlation with 
brooding rumination (r(113) = .664, p < .001). However, depressive symptoms did 
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not correlate with post-image reactivity (r(113) = -.040, p = .671), frontal asymmetry 
(r(113) = .147, p = .117), or parietal asymmetry (r(113) = .001, p = .995).  
Relationships Between Trait Vulnerability Markers 
This section tests the hypotheses regarding relationships among trait emotion 
regulation measures. As all hypotheses predict that vulnerability is related to 
individual variability in reactivity to unpleasant emotional images, I did not examine 
startle reactivity to pleasant images any further. Additionally, in order to reduce the 
large number of potential correlations between variables and minimise the possibility 
of type 1 error, analyses focus on specific predictions, as outlined in the hypotheses. 
Although I report correlations with all three measures of startle reactivity (early, late, 
and post-image time points), hypothesis testing focused on the post-image time point, 
as that most clearly reflects emotion regulation (as opposed to emotional responding). 
Descriptive statistics for all study variables are presented in Table 2.1 and the 
correlations between study variables are presented in Table 2.2.  
Regional EEG Activity and Spontaneous Emotion Regulation. Contrary to 
Jackson and colleagues’ (2003) findings, no correlation was observed between frontal 
asymmetry and post-image emotion reactivity following unpleasant images (r(113) = 
-.099, p = .292). Because Jackson and colleagues reported their relationship between 
emotion reactivity and frontal asymmetry at frontal-pole and frontal-central sites 
(unlike the frontal sites used in this study), exploratory correlations were also 
computed for these sites. No correlations with post-image emotion reactivity were 
found at either frontal-pole (r(113) = -.044, p = .639) or frontal-central (r(113) = -
.082, p = .384) sites. Thus, in this much larger sample of young women with no 
previous diagnosis of depression, no support was found for the hypothesis that frontal 
asymmetry, in isolation, relates to spontaneous emotion regulation.  
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A non-predicted significant negative correlation was observed (see Figure 2.3) 
between parietal asymmetry and post-image reactivity following unpleasant images 
(r(113) = -.197, p = .035), such that individuals with greater right parietal activity (as 
indexed by more negative parietal asymmetry scores) showed more emotion reactivity 
following offset of unpleasant images than those with lower right parietal activity. 
This is an interesting finding as parietal asymmetry has been related to depression 
(e.g. Bruder et al., 1997; Kentgen et al., 2000; Stewart et al., 2011) but no relationship 
between emotion regulation and parietal asymmetry has been established. However, 
this relationship is the opposite of what might be expected given that low right 
parietal activity and larger post-image startle potentiation are proposed to both be 
vulnerability markers of depression. 
Table 2.1.  
Descriptive statistics for time-one variables  
Variable Name Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Frontal Asymmetry -.0292 .0942 -.2732 .1871 
Parietal Asymmetry .0567 .3189 -0.7137 1.294 
Early Pleasant Reactivity -.0757 4.390 -10.89 13.04 
Early Unpleasant Reactivity .8922 5.226 -12.06 21.84 
Late Pleasant Reactivity -1.109 6.099 -23.39 14.61 
Late Unpleasant Reactivity 1.097 6.249 -15.27 16.22 
Post-Image Pleasant Reactivity .0615 5.167 -16.69 16.44 
Post-Image Unpleasant Reactivity .0029 5.464 -11.15 15.85 
Brooding Rumination 9.278 3.074 5 18 
Beck Depression Inventory 7.061 5.326 0 21 
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 Table 2.2 
Correlations Among Study One Variables 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Frontal  
Asymmetry 
1          
2 Parietal 
Asymmetry 
-.268** 1         
3 Early Probe 
Pleasant 
.152 -.090 1        
4 Early Probe 
Unpleasant 
.066 .012 .256* 1       
5 Late Probe 
Pleasant 
.062 -.054 .105 -.017 1      
6 Late Probe 
Unpleasant 
-.036 -.058 .179 .001 .531** 1     
7 Post-Image Probe 
Pleasant 
-.080 .040 -.044 -.161 .004 .014 1    
8 Post-Image Probe 
Unpleasant 
-.099 -.197* -.166 -.012 -.007 .135 .261** 1   
9 Brooding 
Rumination 
.022 .089 -.124 .053 -.162 .134 -.083 -.006 1  
10 Beck Depression 
Inventory 
.147 .001 .037 -.005 -.104 .039 -.049 -.040 .664** 1 
NB: ** p < .01  * p < .05 
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Frontal by parietal interactions were then tested as predictors of spontaneous 
emotion regulation using a hierarchical linear regression analysis (see Table 2.3). 
Frontal and parietal asymmetries were entered at Stage 1 and the frontal by parietal 
interaction term was entered at Stage 2. Frontal and parietal activity did not interact to 
predict responses to the post-image probe (β = -.066, p = .592). The correlation 
between parietal asymmetry and the post-image probe (reported above) was also 
observed in this regression analysis (β = -.241, p = .015). 
The only significant finding for the post-image probe (regulation) time point 
was that right parietal activity directly predicted emotion reactivity (as reported 
above). Importantly, frontal asymmetry and right parietal activity did not interact to 
predict post-image probe reactivity. This result suggests that regional EEG measures 
of frontal and parietal activity that, according to Heller (1993), reflect a marker for 
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Figure 2.3. Correlation between parietal asymmetry and emotion reactivity to 
unpleasant images at the post image probe 
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depression, do not reflect a different manifestation of the same underlying process as 
spontaneous emotion regulation as measured by post-image probe reactivity in the 
startle paradigm. However, parietal asymmetry does appear to be related to 
spontaneous emotion regulation. 
 
Brooding Rumination and Spontaneous Emotion Regulation. Brooding 
rumination did not correlate with unpleasant emotional reactivity at the post-image 
probe (r(113) = .006, p = .951). This indicates that brooding rumination does not 
reflect the same underlying vulnerability trait as spontaneous regulation.  
Brooding rumination and regional EEG activity. Brooding rumination also 
showed no relationship with frontal asymmetry (r(113) = .022, p = .816) or parietal 
asymmetry (r(113) = .089, p = .342). This indicates that brooding rumination does not 
reflect the same underlying vulnerability trait as regional EEG activity.  
Brooding rumination summary. Taken together these findings indicate that 
brooding rumination appears to reflect a unique manifestation of vulnerability to 
Table 2.3 
Frontal and parietal asymmetries predicting unpleasant emotion reactivity at the post image probe. 
 Predictor R2 ΔR2 β t p 
Step 1  .064    .025 
 Frontal Asymmetry   -.164 -1.726 .087 
 Parietal Asymmetry   -.241 -2.540 .015 
Step 2  .066 .002   .592 
 Frontal Asymmetry   -.156 -1.617 .109 
 Parietal Asymmetry   -.282 -2.314 .023 
 Frontal Asymmetry x Parietal 
Asymmetry 
  -.066 -.537 .592 
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depression. In other words, it is a different vulnerability trait marker than spontaneous 
regulation or regional EEG activity.  
Discussion 
The aim of Study One was to test whether three trait markers of emotion 
regulation (spontaneous emotion regulation, regional EEG activity, and brooding 
rumination) are common manifestations of the same vulnerability to depression or 
whether each operates as an independent marker of vulnerability. Spontaneous 
regulation was measured using a startle reactivity index of emotional reactivity after 
the offset of an emotional image. Two additional measurements of emotional 
reactivity were obtained during the image, and a baseline measurement of startle 
magnitude in the absence of emotional stimuli was also used. Frontal asymmetry and 
right parietal activity were indexed using regional measures of EEG activity, 
measured as the inverse of alpha power. Finally, brooding rumination was indexed 
using self-reported scores on the Ruminative Response Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). The core finding was that none of the hypothesised relationships between these 
trait measures of emotion regulation were observed, suggesting that spontaneous 
regulation of emotion, regional EEG markers of vulnerability, and self-reported 
brooding rumination each reflect independent markers of vulnerability to depression. 
However, an unpredicted relationship was observed between spontaneous emotion 
regulation and parietal asymmetry, such that high right parietal activity was 
associated with poorer emotion regulation. 
Startle Eye-Blink 
The expected effect of emotion reactivity at the late probe was observed, 
indicating that modulation of emotional reactivity by valence of the emotional images 
was achieved. However, emotion reactivity at the early probe time point was 
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inconsistent with the pattern of startle attenuation typically observed at this point of 
processing high arousal stimuli (Bradley et al., 1993). Attenuation of the startle in the 
presence of high arousal images (regardless of valence) is proposed to reflect sensory 
gating that protects the processing of the foreground image from interruption by the 
probe (Filion et al., 1998). In the current study, no attenuation was observed to 
pleasant images. Also, rather than attenuation to unpleasant images a trend for 
potentiation to unpleasant images was observed. This indicates that rather than 
reflecting the protection of early attentional information, responses to the early probe 
indexed very early emotional reactivity to (specifically) images with an unpleasant 
valence. This is likely to reflect early activation of defensive motivational systems – 
the same system that is proposed to potentiate startle at the later time point (Bradley et 
al., 2001). Importantly, these findings indicate the early probe did not tap early 
attentional processes with this sample as intended, making it impossible to interpret 
the early probe responses as attentional.   
Patterns of emotional responding across time to startle probes are well 
documented (e.g. Bradley et al., 2006, Bradley et al., 1999), and significant 
potentiation of the startle by unpleasant images has been observed very early in 
emotional responding (e.g. by 500ms; Bradley et al., 2006). Early processing of 
emotional information is affected by individual differences. For example, Sass, 
Heller, Stewart, Silton, Edgar, Fisher and Miller (2010) showed that individuals with 
high levels of anxiety (as measured by anxious arousal and anxious apprehension 
levels) had a larger emotional response at very early stages of processing measured 
using event related potentials. Additionally, Li, Zinbarg and Pallar (2007) found that 
negative information was processed more quickly by individuals scoring high on trait 
anxiety than those with low trait anxiety scores. Therefore, it is conceivable that 
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potentiation to unpleasant images at the early probe, as observed in the current study, 
is driven by individuals with high levels of anxiety. However, as the current study did 
not record anxiety this hypothesis cannot be tested in this study.  
Spontaneous Emotion Regulation and Regional EEG Activity 
Based on Jackson and colleagues’ (2003) study, it was hypothesized that 
rightward frontal asymmetry would relate to greater post-image emotional reactivity. 
No evidence for this relationship was observed. Jackson’s findings have been used as 
indirect support for Davidson’s (2004; 1998) theory that rightward frontal asymmetry 
reflects less adaptive emotional regulation and is a vulnerability marker for 
depression. Inconsistent with this proposal, current findings indicate that spontaneous 
emotion regulation and frontal asymmetries may be independent markers of 
vulnerability.  
The methodology of the current study closely matched that of Jackson and 
colleagues’ (2003), although with a much larger sample. It should be acknowledged 
that either Jackson’s or the current results may represent a spurious finding. As such, 
my findings beg further investigation and replication. One disparity that may account 
for the current failure to replicate Jackson is the use of a different participant sample. 
First, Jackson recruited older men and women (57 to 60 years old) whereas the 
current study recruited younger women (18 to 24 years old). Regional EEG activity 
measurements have been shown to be less consistent in older, relative to younger, 
populations (Duffy, Albert, McAnulty & Garvey, 1984; Duffy, McAnulty & Albert, 
1993). Similarly, older adults produce the typical valence modulation of startle eye-
blink responses to emotional images less consistently than younger populations (e.g. 
Feng, Courtney, Mather, Dawson, & Davison, 2011). Older populations have also 
been found to habituate more quickly and produce smaller magnitude blinks (Ford & 
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Pfefferbaum, 1991; Ludewig, Ludewig, Seitz, Obrist, Geyer, & Vollenweider, 2003). 
Taken together, it is possible that my study is tapping into different processes, or 
different stages of processing to Jackson and colleagues’, leading to a disparity in our 
results. For example, Jackson’s measurement at the post-image offset time point could 
be tapping into a delayed emotional response, rather than a sustained emotional 
response. However, if this were the case it might expected that startle eye-blink 
modulation during picture viewing would not have been found, which they report. 
Importantly, whilst it is unclear how the nature of age differences may account for the 
present failure to replicate Jackson, it is a consideration to bear in mind, especially 
given that Jackson and colleagues’ findings have been generalized to younger 
populations as support for resting prefrontal activity as a mediator of spontaneous 
emotion regulation (e.g. Kim et al., 2012; Lopez-Durren et al., 2011).  
 A second disparity between the population used in Jackson and colleagues’ 
(2003) study and the current study, is that whereas Jackson did not report controlling 
for previous or current experience of depression, the present study controlled for these 
variables; participants reported no history of depression and were not currently 
depressed (mean BDI score = 7.06; see Table 2.1). Frontal EEG asymmetries show a 
relationship with current (Gotlib et al., 1998; Henriques & Davidson, 1991) and 
previous (Gotlib et al., 1998; Henriques & Davidson, 1990; Stewart et al., 2011) 
depression. Further, there is a considerable body of evidence showing that patterns of 
startle responding differ for depressed (e.g. Dichter et al., 2004; Dichter et al., 2008; 
Moran et al., 2012) and dysphoric individuals (Mneimne et al., 2008; Taubitz et al., 
2012), compared to never depressed controls. It is possible that the findings of 
Jackson and colleagues are driven by people within their sample who had either 
previously, or were at the time, experiencing depression (or high levels of depressive 
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symptoms). If this were the case, then the present failure to replicate Jackson and 
colleagues is not surprising as these participants were not present within the current 
sample.  
Taken together, it is possible that the specific sample used within my study 
accounts for the failure to replicate Jackson and colleagues’ (2003). I chose to recruit 
young women as they represent a more homogenous sample in regards to 
vulnerability to depression, as well as emotional responding and regulation. My 
sample was also larger and therefore had greater statistical power than the original 
study. Due to these factors, my sample should provide clearer insight into the 
relationship between spontaneous emotion regulation and regional EEG markers of 
vulnerability to depression. However, it may be that in making the sample more 
homogenous, I excluded the individuals with the very characteristics that were in fact 
driving Jackson and colleagues’ original effect. 
While the expected correlation between frontal asymmetry and spontaneous 
emotion regulation was not found, an unexpected (though weak) relationship between 
parietal asymmetry and spontaneous regulation of emotion was observed. Higher right 
parietal activity (i.e., rightward parietal asymmetry) was related to poorer spontaneous 
emotion regulation (more post-image potentiation). This finding is the opposite to 
what would be predicted based on proposals that depression is associated with low 
right parietal activity and poorer emotion regulation (e.g. Bruder et al., 2007; 
Davidson, 1998). The parietal cortex is important in the orienting of attention to 
salient (e.g. emotional) stimuli and also in the voluntary shifting of attention (Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002). Further, the parietal cortex is associated with arousal responses – 
with higher rightward activity reflecting increased arousal experience (Anders, Lotze, 
Erb, Grodd, & Birmaumer, 2004). It could be that individuals with a rightward 
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parietal asymmetry had a stronger arousal response to images (they were more 
salient) culminating in sustained attention to emotion. As such, emotional responses 
took longer to regulate as reflected by the sustained potentiated startle response. A 
number of factors could produce a pronounced arousal experience. One possibility is 
anxious-arousal (Heller & Nitschke, 1998). It is possible that the relationship between 
high right parietal activity and poorer emotion regulation relates to higher levels of 
anxious arousal. However, this is just speculation, as I did not measure anxiety. It is 
also possible that higher levels of arousal were caused by an environmental factor, 
potentially something as simple as caffeine intake (e.g. drinking coffee), which is 
thought to increase right parietal activity by increasing arousal (e.g. Stewart et al., 
2011). 
Brooding Rumination, Spontaneous Regulation, and Regional EEG Activity.  
Brooding rumination did not correlate with spontaneous emotion regulation or 
patterns of regional EEG activation, suggesting that it is an independent marker of 
depression vulnerability. Interestingly, brooding rumination was the only trait 
measure of emotion regulation in the current study to correlate with current 
depressive symptoms – a finding that has frequently been reported in the literature 
(Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Mezulis et al., 2007; Treynor et al., 2003). This suggests that 
brooding rumination may be reflective of current non-clinical depressive 
symptomology.  
Summary 
The first study was designed to test the degree to which three measures of 
emotion regulation reflect different manifestations of the same underlying 
vulnerability traits of depression, or are independent factors that reflect separate 
vulnerabilities. Of particular interest, no support was found for frontal EEG 
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asymmetries alone, or in conjunction with parietal activity, predicting spontaneous 
regulation as indexed by the startle eye-blink. However, results do suggest that there 
is a relationship between parietal asymmetry and spontaneous emotion regulation. 
Second, the early probe did not index attentional processes as expected but instead 
appeared to index early defensive activation to negative images. Although these 
results could possibly be interpreted within the context of anxiety, the current study 
was limited by the fact that no direct measures of anxiety were included. Importantly, 
the core finding was that spontaneous emotion regulation, frontal asymmetry, and 
brooding rumination do not appear to reflect common underlying vulnerability to 
depression but rather are independent vulnerability factors. This suggests that future 
studies should examine these factors as independent markers of vulnerability with 
differing manifestations rather than as common predictors of depression.   
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Chapter Three 
Study Two: The Diathesis Stress Model at Three Months 
The diathesis-stress model proposes that pre-existing differences in ability to 
regulate negative emotions constitute a vulnerability to depression. People less 
capable of regulating negative emotions are more susceptible to the detrimental 
effects of stress. Stress has a well established positive relationship with depression. 
For the vast majority of individuals who experience depression, a significant stressor 
precedes the first episode (Post, 1992; Willner et al., 2012). However, most 
individuals who experience stressful events do not go on to experience depression 
(Bonanno, 2004; Coifman & Bonanno, 2010; Hammen, 2005). The diathesis-stress 
model accounts for such individual differences in responses to stress by proposing 
that some individual traits mark sensitivity to stress, and others mark resilience to 
stress (Monroe & Simons, 1991; Willner et al., 2013). These trait markers of 
sensitivity are a diathesis as they predispose individuals to become depressed if a 
significant stressor is experienced. For an individual trait to be considered a 
vulnerability to depression within the diathesis-stress framework it first must be 
present before a depressive episode is experienced, and second must interact with 
stress to predict changes in depressive symptoms. Trait measures of emotion 
regulation have been proposed to reflect an individual’s sensitivity or resilience to 
stress (Bonanno & Burton, 2013) and thus make a good candidate as a diathesis to 
stress.  
Study One showed that three trait measures of emotion regulation – 
spontaneous emotion regulation, frontal asymmetry, and brooding rumination – are 
independent vulnerability markers that do not reflect different manifestations of the 
same underlying vulnerability to depression. These trait measures of emotion 
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regulation appear to operate independently in the development of depression and can 
therefore be considered as independent diatheses - measurement of one emotion 
regulation marker cannot be generalized to reflect the other markers. As such it is 
important to establish if one, two or all of these indices of trait emotion regulation 
predict depressive symptoms over time, either directly or by interacting with stress 
within a diathesis-stress framework. The aim of Study Two was to test trait markers 
of emotion regulation as both direct predictors of depression, and as factors that 
interact with stress to predict depression, as described by the diathesis-stress 
framework. This follow-up study was conducted three months after the original 
experimental session reported in Study One, and is the first of two follow-up studies. 
An additional follow-up at twelve months (Study Three) is reported in chapter four.  
As described in Study One, the three measures of emotion regulation used were: 
spontaneous emotion regulation, as indexed by post-image startle reactivity; frontal 
and parietal asymmetry, as indexed by regional EEG measures of cortical activity; 
and a self-report measure of brooding rumination. Although some studies have 
reported a relationship between the proposed diatheses and depression, very few have 
done so in a prospective study, and even fewer have tested them within the diathesis-
stress framework. 
Regional EEG Activity 
Three studies have prospectively examined resting EEG activity as a predictor 
of depression (Mitchell & Possel, 2012; Nusslock et al., 2011; Pössel et al., 2008). 
Pössel and colleagues (2008) recorded frontal asymmetry and parietal asymmetry, and 
used these measures to predict self-reported depressive symptoms twelve months 
later. Their sample of 80 adolescents (35 women) was aged between 13 and 15 years 
old and had no previous or current diagnosis of depression. Consistent with the 
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hypothesis that frontal asymmetry is a direct predictor of depression, rightward frontal 
asymmetry predicted increased depressive symptoms at twelve months. However, 
they did not measure life stress and so could not examine regional EEG measures 
within the diathesis-stress framework. Unexpectedly, they found high (rather than 
low) right parietal activity also predicted depression, independent of frontal 
asymmetry. They suggested that anxious arousal (the feeling component aspect of 
anxiety) might mediate the reported relationship between high right parietal activity 
and depression. Although they controlled for anxiety, their measurement mainly 
captured anxious apprehension (the worry component of anxiety) rather than anxious 
arousal. As such, using this measure as a covariate may not have removed variance 
due to anxious arousal. The results of Pössel and colleagues suggest that frontal 
asymmetry shows promise as a candidate diathesis but the role of parietal asymmetry 
is less clear. 
Mitchell and Pössel (2012) also examined frontal asymmetry as a predictor of 
depressive symptoms. Their sample consisted of 41 adolescent boys (mean age = 
13.91) with no previous or current diagnosis of depression. Consistent with results of 
Pössel and colleagues (2008) they found that rightward frontal asymmetry directly 
predicted an increase in self-reported depressive symptoms twelve months later. 
However, once again this relationship was not tested within a diathesis-stress 
framework. Parietal asymmetry was not measured as a predictor.  
Nusslock and colleagues (2011) conducted a comprehensive longitudinal study 
examining the value of frontal asymmetry and cognitive response styles in predicting 
first diagnoses of depression. Rightward frontal asymmetry was found to relate to 
more negative coping styles, and importantly predicted first diagnosis of depression 
over a three year follow-up period. Nusslock and colleagues did not report parietal 
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asymmetry measures. Taken together the results of Pössel and colleagues (2008), 
Mitchell and Pössel (2012), and Nusslock and colleagues (2011) provide consistent 
evidence that rightward frontal asymmetry predicts depression, although null effects 
have also been reported (Blackhart et al., 2006). However, none of these studies tested 
frontal asymmetry within the diathesis-stress framework - that is by determining 
whether asymmetry predicted the response to stress.  The role of parietal asymmetry 
also remains unclear.  
Recent evidence suggests that parietal asymmetry may also play a role in 
depression (Bruder et al., 1997; Bruder et al., 2012; Pössel et al., 2008) and emotional 
processing more broadly (Grimshaw et al., 2014). However, only one study (Pössel et 
al., 2008) has reported parietal asymmetry as a predictor of depression in a 
longitudinal design. Further, while Pössel and colleagues used parietal asymmetry as 
well as frontal asymmetry to predict depression across time, they did not examine the 
interaction between these two regional EEG markers. Heller’s circumplex model 
(1993) proposes that it is the interaction between frontal asymmetry and parietal 
asymmetry that predicts depression. More specifically, low right parietal activity in 
conjunction with rightward frontal asymmetry is hypothesised to reflect depression. 
Conversely, high right parietal activity in conjunction with rightward frontal 
asymmetry is hypothesised to reflect anxious arousal. However, there is little 
empirical evidence on whether parietal asymmetry (alone, or in conjunction with 
frontal asymmetry) directly predicts depression, or predicts depression within a 
diathesis-stress framework.  
Brooding Rumination 
Brooding rumination reliably correlates with current depression (e.g., Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008; Siegle et al., 2004; Treynor et al. 2003) and has been shown in 
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a number of prospective studies to predict depression (Bastin, Bijttebier, Raes & 
Vasey, 2014; Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Bastin et al., 2014; Gibb, Grassia, Stone & 
Uhrlass, 2013; Jose & Weir, 2013; O’Conner, O’Conner & Marshall, 2007; Paredes 
& Zumalde, 2014;). Importantly, brooding rumination has also been shown to 
function as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress framework (Bastin et al., 2014; Cox 
et al., 2011; but also see Paedes & Zumalde, 2014). For example, Cox and colleagues 
(2011) measured brooding in 111 adolescents (80 women; mean age = 16.4 years), 
and assessed stress and depressive symptoms 8 and 12 weeks later. Brooding 
rumination was found to moderate the stress-depression relationship such that high 
levels of brooding exacerbated the effect of stress on depressive symptoms. They 
found no direct relationship between brooding and depressive symptoms. Similar 
results were reported in Bastin and colleagues (2014) in a sample of 368 adolescents 
(232 women; 9-15 years) across a twelve month follow-up period. Taken together, 
these studies indicate that brooding rumination reflects sensitivity to stress. 
Spontaneous Emotion Regulation 
No studies have tested whether a startle index of online and spontaneous 
emotion regulation predicts depressive symptoms across time either directly, or within 
a diathesis-stress framework. My studies address this gap in the literature and include 
spontaneous emotion regulation (as indexed by post-image startle reactivity) as a 
predictor of depression alongside regional EEG markers and brooding rumination.  
Study Two 
The aim of this study was to test trait emotion regulation markers - spontaneous 
emotion regulation, regional EEG activity, and brooding rumination - within the 
diathesis-stress model in a short term longitudinal design. The proposed diatheses and 
depressive symptoms were measured at time one (reported in Study One). Three 
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months later (time two) life stress and depressive symptoms were measured using an 
online survey. Life stress was operationalized as the number of self-reported life 
events (as experienced in one’s day-to-day life) across the three months prior, 
weighted by the degree of distress subjectively experienced for each event.  
In Study Two I also addressed one of the major limitations of Study One – that 
because the research questions focused on depression, no measures of anxiety were 
collected. Anxiety, in particular anxious arousal, has been proposed to moderate the 
relationship between parietal asymmetry and depression (Stewart et al., 2011). 
Anxious arousal is a dimension of anxiety that is characterised by increased 
physiological arousal and feelings of tension in the body. Low right parietal activity 
alone is considered to reflect depression in the absence of anxiety, whereas high right 
parietal activity is proposed to reflect either anxiety alone or depression comorbid 
with anxious arousal (Heller & Nitschke, 1998). Therefore, to ensure that any 
observed relationship between parietal asymmetry and depression could not be 
accounted for by anxious-arousal, I tested whether anxious arousal moderated the 
relationship between parietal asymmetry and depression. 
Hypotheses 
Life Stress. It is well established that stress predicts depression (see Hammen, 
2005). It was therefore expected that life stress would directly predict increases in 
depression at time two.  
Spontaneous emotion regulation. If poor online regulation of emotion is a 
diathesis to depression then emotion reactivity at the post-image probe at time one 
would be expected to interact with life stress to predict depression at time two, such 
that poorer regulators (those more reactive to the post-image probe) would show a 
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stronger relationship between stress and depression, than good regulators (those less 
emotionally reactive to the post-image probe). 
Regional EEG activity. In order to accurately assess the role of regional EEG 
activity within the diathesis-stress framework, anxious arousal was measured. Stewart 
and colleagues (2011) postulated that right parietal activity might moderate the 
relationship between anxious arousal and depression. This proposal is based on 
Heller’s Circumplex model (Heller, 1993; Heller & Nitschke, 1998), which argues 
that high right parietal activity is related to anxious arousal comorbid with depression, 
whereas low right parietal activity is related solely to depression. It was predicted that 
for individuals with high right parietal activity at time one, higher levels of anxious 
arousal would be associated with higher levels of depression at time two; however for 
individuals with low right parietal activity, it was expected there would be no 
relationship between anxious arousal and depression. 
Frontal asymmetry. On the basis of previous studies (Mitchell & Possel, 2012; 
Nusslock et al., 2011; Pössel et al., 2008) frontal asymmetry was expected to directly 
predict depression at time two such that individuals with more rightward asymmetry 
scores at time one would show greater increases in depressive symptoms at time two. 
If frontal asymmetry acts as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress framework, then 
frontal asymmetry should interact with life stress to predict depression at time two. 
Specifically, when levels of life stress are high individuals with relative rightward 
asymmetries are more likely to show increases in depression symptoms, whereas 
relative leftward individuals are less likely to show increased depression symptoms. 
Conversely, when life stress is low depression symptoms should not increase, 
regardless of frontal asymmetry.  
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Parietal asymmetry. Parietal asymmetry has been proposed to relate to 
depression, such that low right parietal activity at time one should predict depression 
(or increased depressive symptoms) at time two (Bruder et al., 1997). However, 
Pössel and colleagues (2008) found that high right parietal activity predicted 
increased depression. There is a high degree of comorbidity between depression and 
anxious arousal (Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998) and Pössel and colleagues 
proposed that their parietal asymmetry – depression relationship was driven by 
anxious arousal. Therefore, investigations of parietal asymmetry and depression 
should control for anxious arousal (see Stewart et al., 2011). As such, anxious arousal 
was controlled for in all analyses that examined parietal asymmetry. Under these 
conditions it was predicted that (consistent with Bruder et al., 1997) low right parietal 
activity at time one would predict depression at time two. Furthermore, if parietal 
asymmetry acts as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress framework, it was expected 
that right parietal activity would interact with life stress to predict time two 
depression, such that those with low right parietal activity would show a strong 
relationship between stress and depression, whereas those with high right parietal 
activity would show a weak relationship between stress and depression.  
Frontal by parietal interaction. Based on indirect empirical findings, Heller 
(1993) suggested that a conjoint measure of frontal and parietal asymmetries may 
both directly, as well as via an interaction with life stress, predict depression at time 
two. Based on Heller’s Circumplex model, it was expected that, because anxious 
arousal was controlled for, individuals with high right parietal activity at time one 
would not show an interaction between frontal asymmetry and life stress in predicting 
depression. However, it was expected that individuals with low right parietal activity 
would show an interaction between frontal asymmetry and life stress that would 
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predict depression at time two; specifically individuals with a rightward frontal 
asymmetry would show increased depressive symptoms when stress is high, but those 
with a leftward frontal asymmetry would be more resilient to stress and thus show 
less depression under high stress conditions, The same pattern of EEG activity may 
also predict depression directly (i.e., not through life stress).  
Brooding rumination. Brooding rumination reflects a maladaptive style of 
emotion regulation and therefore it was predicted that brooding scores at time one 
would interact with life stress to predict increases in depression at time two. 
Consistent with Cox and colleagues (2011) and Bastin and colleagues (2014), 
individuals scoring higher on the brooding scale were expected to experience 
increases in depression when life stress is high, whereas individuals scoring lower on 
brooding were expected to show less increase in depression symptoms in response to 
life stress.  
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-six individuals chose to complete the Study Two survey, out of the 115 
participants from Study One who were invited. All were female, right handed, and 
reported no history of previous depression or neurological disorder at time one. They 
were aged between 18-24 years (M = 19.03, SD = 1.395) when entering the study 
three months previously. Group comparisons (reported below) were made to test for 
differences between those who responded to the three month follow-up questionnaire 
and those who did not.  
Questionnaire Measures  
All questionnaires were adapted for online use in Survey Monkey 
(surveymonkey.com). Participants completed the following questionnaires: 
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BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996). The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) was 
used to assess current symptoms of depression. See Study One for a detailed 
description. 
Life Event Questionnaire (Norbeck, 1984). The life event questionnaire (see 
Appendix D is an eighty-two item questionnaire that asks responders to indicate if 
they have experienced each of the listed events in the last three months and if so, how 
stressful they found the event from “0 = not stressful” to “3 = highly stressful” (e.g. 
“have you experienced a separation with partner or spouse due to conflict”). This 
measure has been specifically designed for use with a population of young women to 
measure events they are likely to encounter and that are typically experienced as 
stressful by this cohort. Life stress can take many forms and attempts have been made 
to classify different forms of life stress (for a review see Monroe & Reid, 1991).This 
measure shows good test-retest reliability and construct validity (see Norbeck, 1984).  
Mini Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (mini-MASQ; Clark & 
Watson, 1995). Anxious arousal was measured using a subscale of the mini MASQ 
(See Appendix E). The Mini MASQ is a 26-item scale that assesses symptoms of 
depression and anxiety. The anxious arousal subscale consists of 10 of these items. 
Participants respond on a 5-point Likert scale as to how they have been feeling over 
the past week, ranging from “1 = not at all” to “5 = extremely” (e.g “have you felt 
your hands were cold or sweaty”). Total scores of anxious arousal range from 10 to 
50, with high scores indicating higher levels of anxious arousal. 
Procedure 
Participants were emailed an invitation to participate. In the email they were 
provided with a link to the survey and a unique identification number. The survey was 
presented on Survey Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com). When participants followed 
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the link they were led to a page explaining the experiment. The participant provided 
informed consent by indicating that they had read this information and agreed to 
participate. The questionnaires were then presented in the order of: Life event 
questionnaire, BDI-II, and the mini-MASQ. Participants were sent a movie voucher 
as thanks for their participation. All questionnaire responses were scored and 
subscales were calculated as per the requirements of each questionnaire. To test the 
hypotheses derived from the diathesis-stress model, the following scores were used 
from each scale: The subjective stress score was used from the life event 
questionnaire, the total depression score from the BDI-II, and the anxious arousal 
scale from the MASQ. Each participant’s scores were then matched to their data from 
Study One. 
Results 
As only a proportion (66%) of the original sample collected at time 1 responded 
to the survey at time 2, it was important to establish whether time two responders 
accurately reflect the wider sample collected at time one. In order to assess this, 
differences in time one variables between responders and non-responders (at time 
two) were analysed. Groups did not differ on frontal asymmetry, t(113) = -.686, p = 
.494; parietal asymmetry, t(113) = -.555, p = .580;  BDI-II at time one, t(113) = 1.435, 
p = .154; brooding rumination, t(113) = 1.100, p = .274; or emotional reactivity at the 
post-image, t(113) = 1.042, p = .300 probe time. Taken together, these results suggest 
that responders at time two reflect the larger sample collected at time one. Descriptive 
statistics for all Study Two predictors and outcome variables are presented in Table 
3.1 for both responders and non-responders. The diathesis-stress model was tested at 
the three month follow-up time point using hierarchical linear regression analysis. 
Depression scores at time two were entered as the dependent variable and the 
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depression scores at time one were entered into each analysis at step one in order to 
covary time one depression, and therefore assess changes in depression over time. For 
all analyses examining the role of parietal asymmetry, anxious arousal was 
statistically controlled for by adding it to at step one of the regression model. 
Correlations between Study Two variables are presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Study Two Variables for both Responders and Non-Responders 
   Time Two Responders 
(N = 76) 
Time Two Non-Responders 
(N = 39) 
Variable Name Mean SD Mean SD 
Frontal Asymmetry -.0248 .0893 -0.0376 0.1036 
Parietal Asymmetry .0685 .3110 0.0335 0.3366 
Post-Image Emotion Reactivity -.0803 5.718 0.8517 4.928 
Brooding Rumination 
 
9.053 3.089 9.718 3.034 
Beck Depression  
Inventory (Time 1) 
 
6.553 5.198 8.051 5.501 
Beck Depression  
Inventory (Time 2) 
 
10.00 8.168 - - 
Life Stress (Time 2) 21.54 15.24 - - 
Anxious Arousal (Time 2) 14.80 5.568 - - 
     
Life Stress and Changes in Depression 
Depression. A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare BDI-II scores at 
time one with time two. BDI-II scores at time two (M = 10.00, SD = 8.168) were 
significantly higher than at time one (M = 6.55, SD = 5.198), t(75) = 5.498, p < .001, 
d = .504.  
Life Stress and depression. A two-step hierarchical linear regression was 
conducted to test life stress as a predictor of changes in depression between time one 
and time two (see Table 3.3). Depression at time two was entered as the dependent 
measure. Depression at time one was entered at step one of the regression as a 
covariate. Life stress was then entered at step two as a predictor of changes in 
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depression. As predicted, this model (R
2
 = .609, p = .005, F (2,73) = 56.968, p < .001) 
showed that both depression (β = .701, p < . 001) at time one and life stress (β = .216, 
p = .005) at time two significantly predicted depression at time two, accounting for a 
total of 60% (adjusted R
2
) of the variance. The addition of life stress significantly 
improved the models prediction (ΔR2 = .044, p = .005). It should also be noted that 
life stress at time two positively correlated with depression scores at time one (r(74) = 
.24, p = .038), indicating that high depression scores at time one may have lead to 
more experience of stress at time two. 
Table 3.2 
Correlations Among Study Two Variables 
 Variable 1 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Frontal  
Asymmetry 
 
1        
2 Parietal  
Asymmetry 
 
-.287** 1       
5 Post-Image Emotion 
Reactivity 
 
.031 -.323** 1      
6 Brooding  
Rumination 
 
.071 .154 .020 1     
7 Beck Depression 
Inventory (Time 1) 
 
.121 .055 -.097 .741** 1    
8 Beck Depression 
Inventory (Time 2) 
 
.150 .033 .028 .684** .752** 1   
9 Life Stress   
(Time 2) 
 
.071 -.019 -.078 .224 .238** .383** 1  
10 Anxious Arousal  
(Time 2) 
 
.144 -.152 .063 .186 .178 .434** .187 1 
 
NB: ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
Tests of the Diathesis-Stress Model 
Spontaneous emotion regulation. A three-step hierarchical linear regression 
was conducted to test the direct relationship between life stress and spontaneous 
emotion regulation (i.e., emotion reactivity at the post-image time point) on time two 
depression, and the diathesis-stress interaction between spontaneous emotion 
regulation and life stress predicting depression at time two. Depression at time one 
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was entered at step one, the predictors (life stress, and post-image emotion reactivity) 
were entered at step two, and the interaction between life stress post-image emotion 
reactivity was entered at step three. Step 1 shows the relationship between depression 
at time 1 and depression at time two. Step 2 adds in stress and post-image reactivity as 
direct predictors of depression, over and above that accounted for by depression at 
time one (that is, whether they predict changes in depression). Step 3 adds the 
interaction term for spontaneous emotion regulation and life stress. If significant, this 
indicates that stress and startle reactivity at the post-image probe interact to predict 
depression, which would suggest that spontaneous emotion regulation acted as a 
diathesis. 
Tabl   Table 3.3 
Hierarchical linear regression model with depression (time 2) as the outcome variable and life-stress (time 2) 
as the predictor. 
 Predictor Adj. R2 R2 ΔR2 β t p 
Step 1  .560 .566    <.001 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
Time 1 
 
   .752 9.815 <.001 
Step 2  .599 .609 .044   .005 
 Beck Depression Inventory  
Time 1 
 
   .701 9.303 <.001 
 Life Stress 
Time 2 
   .216 2.865 .005 
NB. Adj. R2 = Adjusted R2  
 
The results of the regression model are reported in Table 3.4. Step three of the 
model was a significant predictor (R
2
 = .64, p = .050, F (4,71) = 31.870, p < .001) 
explaining 62% (adjusted R
2
) of the variance. As expected, life stress (β = .293, p = 
.001) predicted changes in depression, with more life stress predicting more 
depression at time two. In support of spontaneous emotion regulation acting as a 
diathesis in the diathesis-stress framework, addition of the post-image reactivity by 
life stress interaction a stage three significantly improved the models prediction (ΔR2 
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= .020, β = .276, p = .050). This interaction was plotted using ModGraph (Jose, 2013) 
and is presented in Figure 3.1. ModGraph plots the relationship between two variables 
at three different levels of a third moderation variable (the mean, one standard 
deviation above the mean, and one standard deviation below the mean). Under 
conditions of low stress, post-image reactivity did not relate to depression at time two. 
However, as stress increased, larger post-image reactivity exacerbated the relationship 
between stress and depression, with more reactive individuals (i.e., poorer 
spontaneous regulators) showing more sensitivity to stress - leading to increased 
depressive outcomes - than less reactive individuals at the post-image probe (i.e., 
better spontaneous regulators).  
Tabl Table 3.4 
Hierarchical linear regression model with depression (time 2) as the outcome variable. The predictors 
were life stress and emotion reactivity at the post-image time point and the interaction between post 
image reactivity and life stress. 
 Predictor Adj. R2 R2 ΔR2 β t p 
Step 1  .560 .566    <.001 
 Beck Depression Inventory  
(Time 1) 
 
   .752 9.815 <.001 
Step 2  .607 .622 .057   .007 
 Beck Depression Inventory   
(Time 1) 
 
   .710 9.489 <.001 
 Life Stress  
(Time 2) 
 
   .222 2.978 .004 
 Post-Image Emotion 
Reactivity 
 
   .114 1.561 .123 
Step 3 
 
.622 .642 .020   .050 
 Beck Depression Inventory   
(Time 1) 
 
   .688 9.276 <.001 
 Life Stress  
(Time 2) 
 
   .293 3.603 .001 
 Post image Unpleasant  
Reactivity 
 
   -.110 -.826 .412 
 Post-Image Emotion Reactivity  
x Life Stress (Time 2) 
 
   .276 1.993 .050 
NB. Adj. R2 = Adjusted R2   
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Regional EEG activity. 
Parietal asymmetry and anxious arousal. Anxious arousal has been proposed 
to moderate the relationship between parietal asymmetry and depression (Heller & 
Nitschke, 1998; Stewart et al., 2011). Therefore, the role of parietal asymmetry at 
time one and anxious arousal at time two on depression at time two was tested using a 
three-step hierarchical linear regression. Depression at time two was the dependent 
variable. Depression at time one was entered at step one as a covariate in order to 
assess changes in depression across the three month period. Parietal asymmetry and 
anxious arousal were added at step two and the interaction between parietal 
asymmetry and anxious arousal was entered at step three.  
Step three of this model significantly predicted changes in depression (R
2
 = 
.688, p = .014, F (4,71) = 39.211, p < .001), explaining a total of 67% (adjusted R
2
) of 
the variance, as shown in Table 3.5. The addition of the interaction between anxious 
arousal and parietal asymmetry at step three significantly improved the models 
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Figure 3.1 Moderation by spontaneous emotion regulation of the relationship between stress 
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prediction (ΔR2 = .028, β = -.513, p = .014), indicating that the relationship between 
parietal asymmetry (at time one) and depression (at time two) depended on levels of 
anxious arousal (at time two). This interaction was plotted using ModGraph (Jose, 
2013) and is presented in Figure 3.2. The relationship between low right parietal 
activity and depression was independent of anxious arousal, but the relationship 
between high right parietal activity and depression depended on levels of anxious 
arousal. For individuals with high right parietal activity, high levels of anxious 
arousal were associated with increases in depression whereas low levels of anxous 
arousal were not. This finding supports the relationship proposed by Heller and 
Nitschke (1998) and Stewart and colleagues (2011). 
Tabl Table 3.5 
Hierarchical linear regression model with depression as the outcome variable and anxious arousal and 
parietal asymmetry as predictors. 
 Predictor Adj. R2 R2 ΔR2 β t p 
Step 1  .560 .566    <.001 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
   .752 9.82 <.001 
Step 2  .647 .661 .095   <.001 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
   .698 10.001 <.001 
 Anxious Arousal  
(Time 2) 
 
   .317 4.494 <.001 
 Parietal  
Asymmetry 
 
   .046 .655 .515 
Step 3  .671 .688 .028   .014 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
   .712 10.336 <.001 
 Anxious Arousal  
(Time 2) 
 
   .313 4.592 <.001 
 Parietal  
Asymmetry 
 
   .530 2.591 .012 
 Parietal Asymmetry x  
Anxious Arousal (Time 2) 
 
   -.513 -2.507 .014 
NB. Adj. R2 = Adjusted R2  
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Frontal and parietal asymmetry. Frontal and parietal EEG asymmetries and 
their interaction were examined within the diathesis-stress framework (see Table 3.6). 
Due to the relationship between anxious arousal and parietal asymmetry reported 
above, hierarchical regression analyses included anxious arousal at step one as a 
covariate. This step removes the variance associated with anxious arousal from 
depression scores, allowing for a more direct test of the relationship between 
asymmetry measures and depressive symptoms. A four-step hierarchical regression 
model was tested. Depression and anxious arousal were entered into the model at step 
one as covariates. The three predictors (life stress, frontal asymmetry, and parietal 
asymmetry) were entered at step two. Each of the three two-way interactions (frontal 
x parietal, frontal x life stress, and parietal x life stress) were entered at step three and 
the three-way interaction of life stress x frontal asymmetry x parietal asymmetry was 
entered at step four. This model failed to reach significance for both the three-way 
interactions and the two-way interactions, indicating that regional EEG asymmetries 
did not predict either depression or sensitivity to stress at the three month follow-up.  
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Table 3.6 
Hierarchical linear regression model with depression (time two) as the outcome variable and life 
stress, frontal asymmetry and right parietal activity and their interactions as predictors. 
 Predictor Adj.  R
2
 R
2
 ΔR2 β t p 
Step 1  .649 .659    <.001 
 Anxious Arousal 
(Time 2) 
 
 
   .309 4.465 <.001 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
   .702 10.13 <.001 
Step 2 .667 .689 .031   .085 
 Anxious Arousal 
(Time 2) 
 
   .290 4.167 <.001 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
   .657 9.401 <.001 
 Life Stress 
(Time 2) 
 
   .172 2.480 .016 
 Frontal 
Asymmetry 
 
   .033 .470 .640 
 Parietal 
Asymmetry 
 
   .056 .797 .428 
Step 3 .670 .705 .016   .309 
 Anxious Arousal 
(Time 2) 
 
   .258 3.608 .001 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
   .654 9.272 <.001 
 Life Stress 
(Time 2) 
 
   .236 3.000 .004 
 Frontal 
Asymmetry 
   .164 1.378 .173 
 Parietal 
Asymmetry 
 
   .212 1.287 .202 
 Frontal Asymmetry x 
Life Stress (Time 2) 
   -.136 -1.185 .240 
 Parietal Asymmetry x 
Life Stress (Time 2) 
   -.213 -1.407 .164 
 Frontal Asymmetry x 
Parietal Asymmetry 
   -.066 -.773 .442 
Step 4  .674 .713 .007   .199 
 Anxious Arousal 
(Time 2) 
 
   .249 3.481 .001 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
   .654 9.318 <.001 
 Life Stress 
(Time 2) 
 
   .240 3.072 .003 
 Frontal 
Asymmetry 
   .108 .857 .395 
 Parietal 
Asymmetry 
 
   .345 1.785 .079 
 Frontal Asymmetry x 
Life Stress (Time 2) 
   -.070 -.559 .578 
 Parietal Asymmetry x 
Life Stress (Time 2) 
   -.346 -1.898 .062 
 Frontal Asymmetry x 
Parietal Asymmetry 
   .143 .785 .435 
 Frontal x Parietal x Life Stress    -.211 -1.296 .199 
NB. Adj. R2 = Adjusted R2 
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Brooding rumination. Brooding rumination was tested within the diathesis-
stress framework using a three-step hierarchical regression model. Depression at time 
one was entered into the model at step one. Life stress and brooding rumination were 
entered at step two and the brooding by life stress interaction was entered at step three 
(see Table 3.7). Step three of the model failed to reach significance indicating that life 
stress and brooding rumination did not interact to predict depression at time two. 
However, step two of the model explained 63% (adjusted R
2
) of the variance (R
2
 = 
.643, p = .001, F (3,72) = 42.641, p < .001). Life stress (β = .203, p = .007) and 
brooding rumination (β = .260, p = .016) directly predicted depression at time two. 
This finding indicates that while brooding predicted depression three months later, it 
did not act as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress framework. 
Tabl   Table 3.7 
Hierarchical linear regression model with depression (time two) as the outcome variable and brooding, life stress 
and the brooding x life stress interaction  
 Predictor Adj.  R
2
 R
2 ΔR2 β t p 
Step 1  .560 .566    <.001 
 Beck Depression  
Inventory (Time 1) 
 
   .752 9.815 <.001 
Step 2  .625 .640 .074   .001 
 Beck Depression  
Inventory (Time 1) 
 
   .511 4.818 <.001 
 Life Stress  
(Time 2) 
 
   .203 2.778 .007 
 Brooding  
Rumination 
 
   .260 2.464 .016 
Step 3  .623 .643 .003   .424 
 Beck Depression  
Inventory (Time 1) 
 
   .500 4.665 .<001 
 Life Stress  
(Time 2) 
 
   .385 1.616 .111 
 Brooding  
Rumination 
 
   .360 2.206 .031 
 Brooding Rumination x  
Life Stress 
 
   -.228 -.804 .424 
NB. Adj. R2 = Adjusted R2 
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Discussion 
Study Two tested whether three trait measures of emotion regulation predicted 
depression within the diathesis-stress framework. The measures of emotion regulation 
recorded at time one were spontaneous emotion regulation as measured by startle 
modulation, regional EEG activity, and brooding rumination. At a three month 
follow-up (time two), stress and depression were recorded. Time one measures of 
emotion regulation were then tested to examine whether they acted as a diathesis 
(sensitivity to stress) to predict depression. It was predicted for each of the trait 
measures of emotion regulation that, should they act as a diathesis to depression, they 
would interact with life stress to predict depression at time two. The core findings 
were that: (1) spontaneous emotion regulation acted as a diathesis within the 
diathesis-stress framework; (2) regional EEG activity did not predict depression either 
directly, or within the diathesis-stress framework; and (3) brooding rumination 
predicted depression directly, but not within the diathesis-stress framework. 
Depression symptoms at time one significantly predicted depression symptoms 
at time two, showing that these individuals manifested moderate stability of 
depressive symptoms over three months. Additionally, life stress significantly 
predicted increases in depression at time two (when controlling for time one 
depression). Of note was the finding that depressive symptoms showed a marked 
increase between time one to time two. My data does not speak to why this may be, 
however, the population used (young women starting their first year of university) 
were selected as they were engaged in a developmental period of change and thus 
likely to encounter experiences that may have been particularly stressful (Schulenberg 
et al., 2004). The positive correlation observed between time one depressive 
symptoms and time two life stress indicates that more depressed individuals may go 
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on to experience (or at least report) more life stress. It should be noted that life 
stresses are not simply random events; some people may engage in behaviours that 
make them more or less likely to experience stress, or to feel stressed by those 
experiences.  Depression may also cause people to remember events as more stressful. 
Thus depression and stress may be interconnected across these two time points. These 
findings do indicate that life stress was an important factor in the perpetuation of 
depressive symptoms in the current sample, but also show that the issue of causality 
may be more complex than is suggested by the simple prediction of stress to 
depression indicated here. 
Spontaneous Emotion Regulation 
Spontaneous emotion regulation was proposed to act as a diathesis to 
depression. Indeed, spontaneous emotion regulation, as indexed by the post-image 
startle eye-blink, acted as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress framework. Startle 
responses to the negative post-image probes interacted with life stress to predict 
increases in depression at time two. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, poorer emotion 
regulators were more sensitive to stress, and showed larger increases in depression 
when stress was experienced. However, good emotion regulators were more resilient 
in the face of stress and did not show significant increases in depression, regardless of 
life stress. This finding is important as, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
longitudinal study to test this relationship between spontaneous emotion regulation, 
stress, and depression, and supports theoretical models of emotion regulation 
operating as a vulnerability marker in the diathesis stress model (e.g. Davidson 1998; 
Gross, 2013). These findings also show that startle measures of online spontaneous 
regulation can predict depression, providing an objective and useful alternative to 
instructed emotion regulation paradigms. 
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Regional EEG Activity 
Frontal and parietal asymmetries did not directly predict depression, nor did 
they interact with stress to predict depression. As such, these particular regional EEG 
markers do not seem to act as a diathesis in the diathesis-stress model; at least at a 
three month follow-up time point. Although this result is inconsistent with previous 
reports of frontal asymmetry predicting depression, an important distinction is that the 
present study uses a three month follow-up period, whereas previous longitudinal 
studies have used longer follow-up periods (twelve months: Pössel et al., 2008, 
Mitchel & Pössel, 2012; and 3 years: Nussock et al., 2011). Therefore, it may be that 
regional EEG activity is only predictive over a longer period of time, when ample 
opportunity to experience life stress is allowed for. On the other hand, failure to find a 
predictive relationship between frontal asymmetry and depression across a twelve 
month period has also been reported (e.g. Blackhart et al., 2006). 
Brooding Rumination 
Brooding rumination was a direct predictor of depression at the short-term three 
month follow-up. This result replicates a number of findings (Burwell & Shirk 2007; 
Mezulis et al. 2011) showing that brooding predicts depression. This finding is 
particularly interesting given that brooding rumination was the only proposed 
diathesis that directly predicted depression in the current study. It may be that 
measures of brooding rumination tap, to some degree, into current depression 
symptomology, as well as reflecting a trait vulnerability to depression. This 
perspective is further supported by the findings of Study One where measures of 
brooding strongly correlated with current depression (r(74) = .66). However, as 
brooding rumination at time two was not measured, the extent to which brooding and 
depression scores covary across time could not be analysed.  
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Whilst brooding directly predicted depression, it did not act as a diathesis within 
this diathesis-stress model. As discussed in regards to regional EEG activity, it may 
be that a three month follow-up did not allow for sufficient stress to be experienced to 
reveal a diathesis in this variable. However, Cox and colleagues (2011) found 
brooding rumination acted as a diathesis at three months. Further, when controlling 
for BDI-II scores at time one, stress significantly predicted BDI-II scores at time two 
in the current study. These results suggest that in the three month period between time 
one and time two the levels of stress experienced did affect depression scores (i.e., 
three months was a sufficient time period to experience a certain amount of life stress, 
and for the stress to predict more depressive symptoms). This finding suggests that 
there was enough variance in life stress to detect changes in depression, however 
there may not have been enough to detect changes in depression based on the 
interaction between brooding and life stress.  
Although previous findings of brooding interacting with stress to predict 
depression at a three month period were not replicated, it should be noted that the 
current sample consisted of a 76 young adults (aged 18 – 24) whereas past studies 
investigating brooding rumination within the diathesis-stress model have examined 
the relationship in adolescents (Bastin et al., 2014; Cox et al., 2011) and in larger 
samples. However, Paredes and Zumalde (2014) reported results consistent with the 
current study – brooding directly predicted depression, but was not a diathesis – in a 
large population of adolescents. Based on the mixed patterns of findings, it appears 
that the relationship between brooding rumination and stress to predict depression is 
inconsistent, indicating that other factors (such as developmental period) may 
moderate how brooding rumination operates within the diathesis-stress model.  
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Summary 
The current study aimed to test whether three trait measures of emotion 
regulation acted as diatheses within the diathesis-stress framework to predict 
depression, or predicted depression directly, at a three month follow-up. Brooding 
rumination was the only measure that directly predicted increases in depressive 
scores. Spontaneous regulation of emotion, as indexed by the startle eye blink, was 
the only proposed trait that acted as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress framework 
(poorer regulators were more sensitive to stress, and showed increasing depressive 
symptoms with higher stress levels). However, it could be that a longer term follow-
up, that allows for more life stress to occur, may untangle whether regional EEG 
measures (frontal and parietal asymmetries) and brooding rumination also act as 
diatheses to depression.  
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Chapter Four 
Study Three: The Diathesis Stress Model at Twelve Months 
In Study three, I tested the three proposed diatheses – spontaneous emotion 
regulation, regional EEG activity, and brooding rumination – as predictors of 
depression within the diathesis-stress model at a twelve month follow-up. In Study 
Two the diathesis-stress model was tested in a three month follow-up, and revealed 
that spontaneous emotion regulation, as measured by the startle eye-blink response, 
acted as a diathesis while the other proposed trait vulnerabilities did not act as 
diatheses. However, it is possible that some diatheses are only apparent across a 
longer period, when enough time has elapsed for sufficient stress to be experienced 
and depressive symptoms to manifest. To test this possibility the current study 
replicated the design of Study Two but tested the proposed traits within the diathesis-
stress model as predictors of depression at twelve months from time one.  
Study Two found that regional EEG activity did not act within a diathesis-stress 
framework to predict depression, nor did it directly predict depression. The latter 
finding is inconsistent with evidence suggesting that frontal asymmetry predicts 
depression (Mitchell & Pössel, 2012; Nusslock et al., 2011; Pössel et al., 2008;). This 
disparity in findings may be due to differences in the follow-up period; two previous 
studies have used a twelve month follow-up (Mitchell & Pössel, 2012; Pössel et al., 
2008), and one study has used a three year follow-up period (Nusslock et al., 2011). 
In light of the failure to replicate findings from these studies at a considerably shorter 
three month follow-up (reported in Study Two), a longer period is warranted.   
Prospective studies examining the relationship between brooding rumination 
and depression, both directly and within the diathesis-stress framework, have yielded 
mixed findings. Bastin and colleagues (2014) found that over a period of twelve 
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months brooding rumination directly predicted depression and operated as a diathesis 
within the diathesis-stress framework. Similarly, Cox and colleagues (2011) found 
that brooding operated as a diathesis in a three month follow-up period, but reported 
that brooding did not directly predict depression. In a six month follow-up study, 
Praedes and Zumalde (2014) failed to find that brooding rumination moderated the 
stress depression relationship, though they did find that brooding directly predicted 
depression. Taken together, it is unclear how brooding rumination relates to 
depression over time.  
No previous studies have examined spontaneous emotion regulation, as indexed 
by the startle reflex, as a predictor of depression over time, directly or within the 
diathesis-stress framework. However, spontaneous emotion regulation was the only 
proposed trait marker of vulnerability to depression that acted as a diathesis within the 
diathesis-stress framework at the three month follow-up. As such, this marker appears 
to reflect sensitivity to stress, at least over a relatively short (three month) period of 
time. However, the reliability of this marker as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress 
framework to predict depression over a longer period of time is still unknown.  
Study Three 
The aim of Study Three was to the test trait emotion regulation markers – 
spontaneous emotion regulation, regional EEG activity, and brooding rumination – 
within the diathesis-stress framework across a twelve month period. The same design 
was used as for Study Two but at 12 (rather than three) months. The proposed 
diatheses were measured at time one (as reported in Study One) and stress and 
depression were recorded twelve months later, using an online questionnaire. 
Participants from time one were contacted at twelve months with an invitation to 
complete an online survey. A number of participants from time one responded at both 
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time two and time three, however, a significant proportion of time three participants 
did not complete the time two survey. For this reason a follow-up investigation across 
all three time points was not possible. Rather, Study Three complemented Study Two 
as an additional follow-up study of the participants from Study One.  
Hypotheses 
Spontaneous emotion regulation. No previous studies have investigated startle 
measures of spontaneous emotion regulation in a twelve month follow-up design. 
However, based on the results of Study Two the same hypotheses were adopted as 
proposed and supported in Study Two, that spontaneous emotion regulation (as 
measured by startle reactivity to the post-image probe) at time one would interact with 
stress to predict depression at time three.  
Regional EEG activity. 
Frontal asymmetry. Based on the same reasoning presented in Study Two, 
frontal asymmetry was expected to directly predict depressive symptoms. No studies 
have tested resting frontal asymmetries across twelve months within the diathesis-
stress framework. However, if frontal asymmetry acts as a diathesis within the 
diathesis-stress framework then frontal asymmetry should interact with life stress to 
predict depression in the manner hypothesised in Study Two. 
Parietal asymmetry. As described in Study Two, it was expected that parietal 
asymmetry would predict depression directly, such that lower right parietal activity 
would predict increases in depressive symptoms at twelve months. It is unknown 
whether right parietal activity operates as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress model. 
However, if it does then individuals with low right parietal activity may be more 
sensitive to stress and thus would show increases in depression when life stress is 
experienced. Anxious arousal has been proposed to moderate the relationship between 
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parietal asymmetry and depression (see Heller & Nitschke, 1998; Stewart et al. 2011) 
such that higher right parietal activity would be observed in depression that is 
comorbid with anxious arousal. This relationship was observed in Study Two and 
therefore anxious arousal was statistically controlled for in all analyses that included 
parietal asymmetry as a predictor of depression. 
Frontal by parietal interaction. No studies have reported the relationship 
between frontal and parietal asymmetries as direct predictors of depression or as 
interacting with stress to predict depression. Based on the relationships proposed by 
Heller’s Circumplex Model (1993), it may be that individuals with low right parietal 
activity and a rightward frontal asymmetry show increased depression at the twelve 
month follow-up. Further, low right parietal activity and rightward frontal asymmetry 
may act as a diathesis and interact with stress to predict depression. In contrast, 
individuals with low right parietal activity and leftward frontal asymmetries are 
expected to be resilient to stress and thus show less increases in depressive symptoms 
when stress is experienced. 
Brooding rumination. Longitudinal studies examining the relationship 
between brooding rumination and depression, both directly and within the diathesis-
stress framework within a twelve month follow-up period have shown mixed findings 
(Bastin et al., 2014; Cox et al., 2011; Praedes & Zumalde, 2014). Based on the 
findings of Study Two, brooding rumination was expected to directly predict 
depression. Further, if brooding rumination acts as a diathesis, then brooding 
rumination at time one should interact with stress to predict depression at time three, 
in the manner described in Study Two.  
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Method 
The method of Study Three mirrored that of Study Two with the exception that 
the participants were invited to complete the follow-up survey twelve months from 
time one, rather than three months.  
Participants 
Sixty three individuals chose to participate in Study Three. Of the 115 
individuals who participated in Study One 113 were invited complete Study Three as 
two individuals asked to be removed from the database at Study Two. Of these, 46 
had also participated in the three month follow-up. Thus, although there was some 
overlap between the two samples, 30 people participated at 3 months but not at twelve 
months, and 17 people participated at twelve months but not at three months. All 
participants were female, right handed, and reported no history of previous depression 
or neurological disorder at time one. They were aged 19 to 24 years (M = 19.84, SD = 
1.32).  
Questionnaire Measures 
The same measures were used as those reported in Study Two. These were the 
BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996), the Life Event Questionnaire – modified for use with 
female respondents (Nordbeck, 1984), and the anxious arousal subscale of the mini-
MASQ (Clark & Watson, 1995).  
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Study Two. The participants from Study 
One were emailed twelve months from time one with an invitation to participate in 
the follow-up survey. A link to the survey was included in the email. Individuals who 
chose to participate followed the link to the online survey, which was hosted on 
surveymonkey.com. Informed consent was obtained before completing the survey. 
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Questionnaires were completed in the following order: Life Event Questionnaire; 
BDI-II; and mini-MASQ. Participants were sent a movie voucher to thank them for 
their participation.  
Results 
The sample comprised 55% of the participants from time one. Differences were 
assessed between time one variables for participants who responded at time three 
(responders) and those who did not (non-responders). No differences were found for: 
parietal asymmetry, t(113) = -.457, p = .649; BDI-II at time one, t(113) = 1.014, p = 
.313; brooding rumination, t(113) = .885, p = .378; and emotional reactivity at the 
post-image startle probe, t(113) = -.032, p = .974. However, time three responders and 
did differ from non-responders in average frontal asymmetry scores, t(113) = 2.649, p 
= .009, d = .489, such that those who replied to the time three follow-up survey (M = -
.049, SD = .093) had, on average, more rightward asymmetry scores than those who 
did not reply (M = -.004, SD = .091). This difference needs to be considered when 
interpreting the findings of Study Three and is discussed below. Descriptive statistics 
for all Study Three variables are reported in Table 4.1 for both responders and non-
responders. 
The correlations between Study Three variables are presented in Table 4.2. 
Brooding at time one positively correlated with anxious arousal at time three (r(74) = 
.289, p = .027), indicating that individuals who brooded more at time one also 
reported more anxious arousal at time three. Life stress positively correlated with 
depression at time three (r(74) = .406, p = .001), indicating that those participants 
who were experiencing more life stress at time three also reported more depressive 
symptoms at time three. In line with the findings of Study Two, anxious arousal at 
time three showed a strong positive correlation with depression at time three (r(74) = 
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.548, p < .001), indicating that individuals who reported experiencing more anxious 
arousal also reported more depressive symptoms. Anxious arousal also showed a 
strong positive correlation with life stress (r(74) = .454, p < .001), indicating that 
individuals experiencing more anxious arousal also experienced more life stress. 
Table 4.1 
  Descriptive Statistics for Study Three Variables for both Responders and Non-Responders. 
   Time Two Responders 
(N = 63) 
Time Two Non-Responders 
(N = 52) 
Variable Name Mean SD Mean SD 
Frontal Asymmetry 
 
-.0497 .0927 -0.0042 .0906 
Parietal Asymmetry 
 
.0690 .3598 .0416 .6237 
Post-Image Emotion Reactivity .1556 5.761 -0.0132 5.909 
Brooding Rumination 9.048 2.825 9.558 3.357 
Beck Depression Inventory  
(Time 1) 
 
6.603 5.701 7.615 4.831 
Beck Depression Inventory  
(Time 3) 
 
8.508 8.232 - - 
Life Stress (Time 3) 20.48 15.043 - - 
Anxious Arousal (Time 3) 13.63 5.401 - - 
     
Changes in Depression 
A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare BDI-II scores at time one 
with those at time three. BDI-II scores at time three (M = 8.51, SD = 8.23) were 
significantly higher than at time one (M = 6.60, SD = 5.70), t(75) = 2.13, p < .038, d = 
.504. These results show that higher levels of depression were experienced in the 
sample at time three compared to time one. 
Life Stress and Depression 
Life stress was tested as a predictor of changes in depression between time one 
and time three (see Table 4.3.). Depression at time three was entered as the dependent 
measure. Depression at time one was entered at step one as a covariate, and life stress  
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was entered at step two. This model (R
2
 = .340, p = .022, F (2,60) = 15.646, p < .001) 
accounted for 32% (adjusted R
2
) of that variance and showed that both depression at 
time one (β=.443, p < .001) and life stress at time three (β = .260, p = .022) 
significantly predicted depression at time three.  
 
Tabl  Table 4.3 
Hierarchical linear regression model with depression (time 3) as the outcome variable and life-stress (time 2) as 
the predictor. 
 Predictor Adj. R2 R2 ΔR2 β t p 
Step 1  
 
 
.268 .280    <.001 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
   .529 4.866 <.001 
Step 2  .318 .340 .061   .022 
 Beck Depression Inventory  
(Time 1) 
 
   .443 3.992 <.001 
 Life Stress 
(Time 3) 
 
   .260 2.346 .022 
 
 
Table 4.2 
Correlations Among Study Three Variables 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Frontal  
Asymmetry 
 
1        
2 Parietal  
Asymmetry 
 
-.274** 1       
3 Post-image Emotion 
Reactivity 
 
-.046 -.251* 1      
4 Brooding  
Rumination 
 
.107 .110 -.108 1     
5 Beck Depression 
Inventory (Time 1) 
 
.139 -.032 -.281 .671** 1    
6 Beck Depression 
Inventory (Time 3) 
 
.145 -.052 -.166 264* .529** 1   
7 Life Stress   
(Time 3) 
 
.044 -.177 -.001 .112 .329** .406** 1  
8 Anxious Arousal  
(Time 3) 
 
.165 -.012 -.187 289* .481** .548** .454** 1 
NB: ** p < .01  * p < .05 
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Tests of the Diathesis-Stress Model 
Spontaneous emotion regulation. A three-step hierarchical linear regression 
was used to test the relationship between spontaneous emotion regulation and life 
stress on depression. Depression at time three was entered as the outcome variable. 
Depression at time one was entered at step one of the regression as a covariate. Life 
stress and post-image emotional reactivity was entered at step two. The interaction 
between spontaneous emotion regulation and life stress was entered at step three to 
test whether spontaneous emotion regulation acted as a diathesis at the twelve month 
follow-up. Table 4.4 shows the results of this model. The model failed to reach 
significance, indicating that emotion reactivity at the post-image probe did not predict 
depression twelve months later either directly or within the diathesis-stress 
framework. 
Tabl   Table 4.4 
Hierarchical linear regression model predicting depression at time three with life stress and emotion reactivity at 
the post-image probe, and the interaction between post-image reactivity and life stress. 
 Predictor Adj. R2 R2 ΔR2 β t p 
Step 1  .268 .280    <.001 
 Beck Depression Inventory  
(Time 1) 
 
   .529 4.866 <.001 
Step 2  .312 .345 .066   .060 
 Beck Depression Inventory   
(Time 1) 
 
   .425 3.710 <.001 
 Life Stress  
(Time 3) 
 
   .266 2.380 .021 
 Post image Unpleasant  
Reactivity 
 
   -.073 -.676 .501 
Step 3  .333 .376 .031   .096 
 Beck Depression Inventory   
(Time 1) 
 
   .440 3.886 <.001 
 Life Stress  
(Time 3) 
 
   .304 2.704 .009 
 Post image Unpleasant  
Reactivity 
 
   -.324 -1.776 .081 
 Post image Unpleasant Reactivity  
x Life Stress (Time 3) 
 
   .312 1.694 .096 
NB. Adj. R2 = Adjusted R2 
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Regional EEG activity. A four-step hierarchical linear regression was run to 
test the relationship between frontal asymmetry, parietal asymmetry, and life stress in 
predicting depression. Depression at time three was entered as the dependent variable. 
Depression at time one and anxious arousal at time three were entered as covariates at 
step one. The main effects of life stress, frontal asymmetry, and parietal asymmetry 
were entered at step two. Three two-way interactions were then entered at step three, 
frontal asymmetry x parietal asymmetry, frontal asymmetry x life stress, and parietal 
asymmetry x life stress. Finally, the three-way interaction was entered at step four. 
The results of this model are presented in Table 4.5. Step four of the model (R
2
 
= .537, p = .002, F (9,53) = 6.842, p < .001) explained 46% (adjusted R
2
) of the 
variance. Addition of the three-way interaction at step four between life stress, frontal 
asymmetry, and parietal asymmetry improved the models prediction (ΔR2 = .092, β = 
-.838, p = .002). Significant two-way interactions were also observed at step four of 
this model for parietal asymmetry x life stress (β = -.558, p = .007), frontal 
asymmetry x life stress (β = -.489, p = .026), and frontal asymmetry x parietal 
asymmetry (β = .692, p = .038). Step one of this model was also significant (R2 = 
.392, p < .001, F (2,60) = 19.344, p < .001), showing that depression at time one (β = 
.384, p = .004) and anxious arousal at time three (β = .342, p = .001) were both direct 
predictors of depression at time three. Step two and step three of this model failed to 
significantly predict depression.  
All of the main effects and two-way interactions observed in step 4 are 
subsumed within the three-way interaction; therefore, the three-way interaction was 
probed further. To deconstruct the three-way interaction, the sample was median split 
by right parietal asymmetry. The interaction between frontal asymmetry and life 
stress was then examined independently for the high and low right parietal activity 
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Table 4.5 
Hierarchical linear regression model predicting depression at time three with life stress, frontal asymmetry, 
and right parietal activity, and their interactions as predictors 
 Predictor  Adj. R
2 R2 ΔR2 β t p 
Step 1   .372 .392    <.001 
 Anxious Arousal  
(Time 3) 
 
 
    .342 3.330 .001 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
    .384 2.964 .004 
Step 2  .359 .411 .019   .608 
 Anxious Arousal  
(Time 3) 
 
    .319 2.504 .015 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
    .318 2.702 .009 
 Life Stress  
(Time 3) 
 
    .152 1.282 .205 
 Frontal  
Asymmetry 
 
    .036 .335 .739 
 Parietal  
Asymmetry 
 
    -.005 -.048 .962 
Step 3  .363 .445 .034   .356 
 Anxious Arousal  
(Time 3) 
 
    .351 2.279 .009 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
    .358 2.979 .004 
 Life Stress  
(Time 3) 
 
    .083 .602 .550 
 Frontal  
Asymmetry 
    .234 1.146 .257 
 Parietal  
Asymmetry 
 
    .025 .099 .922 
 Frontal Asymmetry x  
Life Stress (Time 3) 
    -.217 -1.022 .311 
 Parietal Asymmetry x  
Life Stress (Time 3) 
    -.191 -1.082 .284 
 Frontal Asymmetry x 
Parietal Asymmetry 
    -.188 -.961 .341 
Step 4   .459 .537 .092   .002 
 Anxious Arousal  
(Time 3) 
 
    .243 1.968 .054 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
    .470 4.053 <.001 
 Life Stress  
(Time 3) 
 
    .029 .224 .823 
 Frontal  
Asymmetry 
    .296 1.563 .124 
 Parietal  
Asymmetry 
 
    .519 1.853 .070 
 Frontal Asymmetry x  
Life Stress (Time 3) 
    -.489 -2.294 .026 
 Parietal Asymmetry x  
Life Stress (Time 3) 
    -.558 -2.821 .007 
 Frontal Asymmetry x 
Parietal Asymmetry 
    .692 2.127 .038 
 Frontal x Parietal  
x Life Stress 
    -.838 -3.252 .002 
NB. Adj. R2 = Adjusted R2 
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Table 4.6 
Hierarchical linear regression models predicting depression at time three with life stress, frontal 
asymmetry, and their interactions for both high and low right parietal activity groups 
 Predictor  Adj.  R2 R2 ΔR2 β t p 
High Right Parietal Activity 
Step 1   .371 .411    <.001 
 Anxious Arousal 
(Time 3) 
 
 
    .471 3.060 .005 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
 
    .292 1.897 .068 
Step 2  .442 .514 .102   .076 
 Anxious Arousal 
(Time 3) 
 
 
    .254 1.483 .150 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
    .248 1.699 .101 
 Life Stress 
(Time 3) 
 
    .369 2.279 .031 
 Frontal 
Asymmetry 
 
 
    .176 1.228 .230 
Step 3   .474 .559 .045   .116 
 Anxious Arousal 
(Time 3) 
 
 
    .114 .612 .546 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
    .241 1.695 .102 
 Life Stress 
(Time 3) 
 
    .539 2.856 .008 
 Frontal 
Asymmetry 
    -.160 1.228 .230 
 Frontal Asymmetry x 
Life Stress (Time 3) 
    .462 1.626 .116 
Low Right Parietal Activity 
Step 1   .348 .391    .001 
 Anxious Arousal 
(Time 3) 
 
 
    .332 1.911 .066 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
    .383 2.203 .036 
Step 2   .299 .393 .001   .969 
 Anxious Arousal 
(Time 3) 
 
 
    .332 1.742 .093 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
    .387 2.086 .047 
 Life Stress 
(Time 3) 
 
    .009 .051 .959 
 Frontal 
Asymmetry 
    -.039 -.248 .806 
Step 3   .444 .537 .144   .010 
 Anxious Arousal 
(Time 3) 
 
 
    .244 1.416 .169 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
(Time 1) 
 
    .572 3.212 .004 
 Life Stress 
(Time 3) 
 
    -.290 -1.526 .140 
 Frontal 
Asymmetry 
    .526 2.142 .042 
 Frontal Asymmetry x Life Stress 
(Time 3) 
    -.734 -2.790 .010 
NB. Adj. R2 = Adjusted R2 
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Figure 4.1 Moderation by frontal asymmetry of the relationship between stress and 
depression for individuals with low right parietal activity (see Table 4.5) 
Frontal 
Asymmetry 
p = .024 
p = .635 
p = .045 
groups using two separate three-step hierarchical linear regressions. As before, 
anxious arousal at time three and depression at time one were entered as covariates at 
step one. The direct predictors, life stress and frontal asymmetry, were entered at step 
two and the interaction between life stress and frontal asymmetry was entered at step 
three.  
The results of these two models are presented in Table 4.6. Step three of the 
model for the high right parietal group failed to reach significance indicating that 
frontal asymmetry and life stress did not interact to predict depression for the high 
right parietal group. However, for the low right parietal group step three of the model 
did reach significance (R
2
 = .537, p = .010, F (5,25) = 5.798, p = .001), explaining 
44% (adjusted R
2
)
 
of the variance. This model yielded a significant interaction 
between frontal asymmetry and life stress that improved the models prediction at step 
three (ΔR2 = .144, β = -.734, p = .010) to predict depression. This interaction was 
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plotted using ModGraph (Jose, 2013) and is presented in Figure 4.1. As predicted by 
the Circumplex Model (Heller, 1993), for individuals with low right parietal activity, 
frontal asymmetry interacted with life stress to predict increases in depression twelve 
months later. Those individuals who displayed relative rightward frontal asymmetries 
showed sensitivity to stress, such that as stress increased these women showed 
increased depressive symptoms over time. In contrast, individuals with relative 
leftward frontal asymmetries displayed resilience to stress and in fact manifested a 
decrease in depressive symptoms over time as stress increased.  
Tabl   Table 4.7 
Hierarchical linear regression model predicting depression at time two with life stress, brooding, and 
their interaction. 
 Predictor Adj. R2 R2 ΔR2 β t p 
Step 1  .268 .280    <.001 
 Beck Depression  
Inventory (Time 1) 
 
   .529 4.866 <.001 
Step 2  .315 .348 .068   .053 
 Beck Depression  
Inventory (Time 1) 
 
   .529 3.571 .001 
 Life Stress  
(Time 2) 
 
   .247 2.198 .032 
 Brooding  
Rumination 
 
   -.122 -.849 .399 
Step 3  .309 .353 .005   .500 
 Beck Depression  
Inventory (Time 1) 
 
   .528 3.496 .001 
 Life Stress  
(Time 2) 
 
   .520 1.244 .218 
 Brooding  
Rumination 
 
   -.010 -.047 .963 
 Brooding Rumination x  
Life Stress 
 
   -.315 -.678 .500 
NB. Adj. R2 = Adjusted R2 
Brooding rumination. Brooding rumination was also tested at twelve months 
within the diathesis-stress framework using a hierarchical linear regression. 
Depression at time one was entered into the model at step one. Life stress and 
brooding rumination were entered at step two. The brooding x life stress interaction 
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term was entered at step three. This model (see Table 4.7) did not reach significance 
at step three showing that brooding rumination did not interact with life stress to 
predict depression at time three. Step two of the model was marginally significant (R
2
 
= .348, p = .053, F (3,59) = 10.502, p = .001), but this result was driven by depression 
at time one (β =.529, p = .001) and life stress (β =.247, p = .032) predicting 
depression at time three. Brooding rumination did not directly predict depression at 
time three in this model (β = -.122, p = .399).   
Discussion 
Study Three assessed three trait measures of emotion regulation as potential 
diatheses in the diathesis-stress model. The measures of trait emotion regulation 
recorded at time one were tested as predictors of depression one year later. The 
important findings of this study were: (1) regional EEG activity acted as a diathesis, 
such that individuals with low right parietal activity and rightward frontal asymmetry 
were more sensitive to stress; (2) spontaneous emotion regulation did not act as a 
diathesis at twelve months, contrary to the findings of the three month follow-up; and 
(3) brooding rumination did not act as a diathesis at twelve months, consistent with 
the findings of the three month follow-up.  
Spontaneous Emotion Regulation 
Spontaneous emotion regulation (post-image startle reactivity) did not act as a 
diathesis within the diathesis-stress model at the twelve month follow-up, whereas it 
did act as a diathesis at the three month follow-up reported in Study Two. This 
difference indicates that online regulatory processes may be more informative in 
regards to depression for shorter time periods. Alternatively, the very large increase in 
depressive symptoms at time two may reflect the notion, proposed earlier, that as this 
population of first year at university students are likely to be experiencing a number 
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life changes (Schulenberg et al., 2004) the three month follow-up time point may be 
tapping into the initial response (maybe shock) these experiences; first time away 
from home and previous social support, failing an assessment, trying to make new 
friends. On the other hand, the one year follow-up may provide a more stable measure 
of stress and depression, as individuals are more likely to have settled into the routine 
of university and because the one year follow-up is at a similar period of the academic 
year to their initial assessment. These hypotheses cannot be tested in the current study 
but may be a useful direction for future research.  
Regional EEG Activity 
Patterns of regional EEG activity predicted sensitivity to stress. It was found 
that individuals with low right parietal activity and rightward frontal asymmetry 
reported increased depressive symptoms when they experienced stress in their lives. 
However, individuals with low right parietal activity and leftward frontal asymmetry 
actually showed lower depressive symptoms when stress increased. Individuals with 
high right parietal activation showed no relationship between frontal asymmetry and 
life stress. Although Pössel and colleagues (2008) found that high right parietal 
activity predicted depression twelve months later, they had not predicted this result 
and suggested that anxious arousal might have mediated this relationship. In line with 
this possibility, the current study controlled for anxious arousal and found no 
relationship between parietal asymmetry and depression. This result seems to provide 
indirect support for a modified version of Heller’s Circumplex model (Heller & 
Nitschke, 1998); when the effects of anxious arousal are accounted for, high right 
parietal activity is not related to depression. However, the current study did not set out 
to test the relationship between parietal asymmetry and anxious arousal – we did not 
measure anxious arousal at time one. As such, future studies should aim to clarify the 
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relationship between parietal asymmetry and anxious arousal, as well as the role of 
anxious arousal in the relationship between parietal asymmetry and depression.  
One possible explanation for why such a pattern of regional EEG activity might 
predispose an individual to develop depression is that regional EEG activity reflects 
cognitive processing styles that bias the processing of emotional information in less 
adaptive ways. In support of this hypothesis, many studies report that emotional 
processing biases are key factors in the development and maintenance of depression 
(see De Raedt & Koster, 2010). Furthermore, this same frontal x parietal interaction 
was observed in a task measuring attention disengagement from angry faces 
(Grimshaw et al., 2014). In this experiment individuals with low right parietal activity 
and rightward frontal asymmetry were slow to disengage from threatening 
information (angry faces), a cognitive bias that is associated with depression (De 
Raedt & Koster, 2010). While this characterized pattern of frontal-parietal activity did 
not directly predict depression in the current study, it did predict depression within the 
diathesis-stress framework. As such, low right parietal activity in conjunction with a 
rightward frontal asymmetry seems to act as a diathesis. Interestingly, when only the 
low right parietal group was considered relative rightward frontal asymmetry 
predicted depression both directly and within a diathesis-stress framework. 
A caveat to the current findings is that the population of individuals who 
responded to the follow-up survey at time three differed systematically in frontal 
asymmetry from the portion of the sample who did not respond. The sample included 
in this study had, on average, a more rightward frontal asymmetry. This bias limits the 
extent to which the present results can be compared to the results of time two (the 
three month follow-up), which found no relationship between regional EEG activity 
and depression. It may be that because this sample included more people with 
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rightward asymmetry, it was better able to pick up the relationship between frontal 
asymmetry and stress sensitivity. Although this difference in frontal asymmetry 
scores is important to bear in mind, it does not completely undermine the current 
results. Current findings were predicted on the basis of, and are to some extent 
consistent with, theoretical explanations of frontal asymmetry.  
Brooding Rumination 
Brooding rumination did not act as a diathesis of stress sensitivity, in line with 
findings from the short term follow-up period. Additionally, brooding rumination 
failed to predict depression directly, which was the case at the three month follow-up 
as well. Previous studies have found brooding to be either a direct predictor of 
depression or a diathesis within the diathesis-stress model (e.g. Bastin et al., 2014; 
Cox et al., 2011, Jose et al., 2014; but also see Paredes & Zumalde, 2014). However, 
all of the prospective studies that have examined the relationship between brooding 
and depression have used younger, adolescent populations. It is conceivable that 
brooding rumination is a less robust predictor of depression across time in later 
developmental periods. It should again be noted that the current sample (of 63) is 
considerably smaller than other longitudinal studies of brooding rumination, and as 
such may lack the necessary power to show such relationships across a long period of 
time.   
Summary 
The current study was designed to test three diatheses within the diathesis-stress 
model at a twelve month follow-up period. It was found that regional EEG activity 
predicted stress sensitivity, such that individuals with low right parietal activity and 
rightward frontal asymmetry were more likely to show increases in depressive 
symptoms (than individuals with other patterns of regional EEG activity) when they 
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experienced stressful events. In contrast to the findings of Study Two, spontaneous 
emotion regulation did not act as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress framework. It 
was also found that brooding rumination did not reflect a diathesis for depression. 
Interestingly, none of the proposed diatheses directly predicted depression at time 
three. 
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Chapter Five 
General Discussion 
In this thesis I examined three trait measures of emotion regulation proposed to 
be vulnerability markers of depression. At time one, three emotion regulation 
measures were assessed: frontal and parietal activity as indexed by regional EEG 
recordings, spontaneous emotion regulation as measured by modulation of the startle 
eye-blink reflex, and brooding rumination as measured by self report. For the most 
part, these three measures had been researched independently of one another, and so it 
has not been clear whether these markers reflect different manifestations of the same 
underlying vulnerability to depression, or are independent vulnerability markers. In 
Study One relationships between these markers were assessed, and results indicated 
that they represent unique vulnerability markers of depression.  
In Study Two (three month follow-up) and Study Three (twelve month follow-
up), I tested whether these emotion regulation measures prospectively predicted 
depression directly, and within the diathesis-stress framework. Consistent with the 
commonly observed stress-depression relationship (e.g., Hammen, 2015), 
highlighting the key role of stress in depression, higher levels of life stress directly 
predicted increased depression symptoms, both three months and twelve months after 
the initial experimental session. Importantly, the core findings of these follow up 
studies in regards to the trait emotion regulation measures were: 1) a frontal by 
parietal interaction acted as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress model to predict 
depression at 12 months; 2) spontaneous emotion regulation acted as a diathesis 
within the diathesis-stress model to predict depression at three months; and 3) 
brooding rumination was the only trait that directly predicted depression, and this was 
only true for the three month follow up time point.  
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Frontal Asymmetry 
Frontal asymmetry did not relate to current depression symptoms at time-one. 
This is not unexpected. Vulnerability markers to depression are stable traits that are 
present prior to the experience of depression (Ingram, Atchley, & Segal, 2011). They 
do not necessarily relate to current depressive symptoms in a healthy population, but 
rather are expected to predict later development of depression. Therefore, the lack of a 
relationship between frontal asymmetry (a vulnerability) and depression at time one is 
not unexpected and is consistent with previous research (Nusslock et al., 2011; 
Mitchell & Pössel, 2012). 
A particularly surprising, and more important, finding across my studies is that 
frontal asymmetry did not predict depression directly, or within the diathesis-stress 
model at time two or time three. This does not support the idea that frontal asymmetry 
is a vulnerability marker for depression, which is particularly notable given that other 
prospective studies have found that frontal asymmetry directly predicts depression 
(Mitchell & Pössel, 2011; Nuslock et al., 2011; Pössel et al., 2008). Differences in 
three methodological factors could explain the discrepancy between my findings and 
the findings of previous studies. These factors include the measure used to assess 
depression, the sample population, and the length of the follow-up periods.  
The current thesis used the BDI-II to assess depression, a sample of young 
healthy women (aged 18 to 24), and follow-up at two later time points (three months 
and twelve months). These factors differ somewhat to previous studies. Nusslock et 
al. (2011) used depression diagnosis, rather than changes in self reported depressive 
symptoms, as the follow up measure of depression. It is possible that frontal 
asymmetry is sensitive to larger scale shifts in depression, rather than more subtle 
changes in depressive symptoms, as measured by the BDI-II. However, inconsistent 
  
105 
with this idea, Pössel and colleagues (2008) and Mitchell and Pössel (2012) found 
that frontal asymmetry predicted these more subtle changes in depressive symptoms, 
measured using the self-rating questionnaire for depressive disorders (Döpfner & 
Lehmkuhl, 2000, cited in Pössel et al., 2008 and Mitchell & Pössel, 2012). It could be 
that the relationship between frontal asymmetry and depression can not be captured 
using the BDI-II, however, this is unlikely given that the BDI-II is a reliable 
measurement of depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 1988).  
While Pössel and colleagues (2008) and Mitchell and Pössel (2012) did use a 
self-report measure of depression symptoms to capture more subtle changes in 
depression, they also used a younger sample (adolescents) than the present study – 
which could explain why the results of my study differ to theirs. It is possible that 
frontal asymmetry is a more sensitive measure, or shifts more readily, in younger 
populations. Furthermore, it is possible that adolescents fluctuate more in depressive 
symptoms across a twelve month period – the length of the follow up used by both 
Pössel et al., (2008), Mitchell & Possel (2012) and the present study. Indeed, with a 
sample of young adults of comparable age to the present study, Nusslock and 
colleagues (2011) used a longer three year follow up. It could be that the present 
study did not find that frontal asymmetry predicted depression across the one year 
follow-up as frontal asymmetry is not a sensitive vulnerability measure across this 
period for young adults (18-24 years old). Perhaps if a longer follow-up time point  
(e.g., three years) was used, a relationship may emerge. In line with this possibility, 
Blackhart and colleagues (2006) also found that frontal asymmetry did not predict 
changes in depression at a twelve month follow up in a population of young adults 
(18-25 years old). Together, the findings of Blackhart and collegues and my study 
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suggests that frontal asymmetry is not a vulnerability marker for depression in young 
adults across a one-year period.  
Due to inconsistencies in findings with regards to the relationship between 
resting EEG and depression, it has more recently been suggested that resting measures 
are not the best way to index frontal asymmetry (for a review see Coan et al., 2006). 
Resting frontal EEG measures came from a dispositional model, which suggests that 
resting asymmetries represent a global tendency to approach or withdraw from 
situations, which in turn represents a vulnerability to depression (e.g. Davidson, 1998; 
2004). While the dispositional model has shown some promise, inconsistent findings 
have led to the proposal of the response capability model (Coan et al., 2006) - a 
modified version of the dispositional model.  The capability model suggests that 
patterns of frontal asymmetry measured in one situation (e.g., at rest) will not 
necessarily generalize to other situations (e.g., the presence of a stressor). The model 
argues that frontal asymmetry patterns in the presence of an emotional challenge 
reflects an individual’s ability to recruit prefrontal mechanisms in aid of regulating 
emotional responses and ultimately reflects the degree to which they are vulnerable or 
resilient to depression in the face of stress. 
Recent investigations of the capability model suggest that frontal asymmetries 
recorded during an emotional challenge are more sensitive to individual differences in 
current and past depression diagnosis, compared to resting frontal asymmetry 
(Stewart, Coan, Towers, & Allen, 2014). Frontal asymmetry during emotional 
challenge was more strongly related to depression status than resting frontal 
asymmetry. Individuals with a history of depression showed more rightward 
asymmetry during the emotion challenge, whereas those with no history of depression 
showed a more leftward asymmetry (Stewart et al., 2014) Additionally, frontal 
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asymmetry measured during a stressor (threat of shock) was a predictor of emotion 
regulation, such that more leftward asymmetry predicted more successful regulation, 
while resting frontal asymmetry failed to account for individual differences in 
emotion regulation (Goodman, Rietschel, Lo, Costanzo, & Hatfied, 2013). 
Additionally, in a test of the diathesis-stress model in children with a familial risk of 
depression, frontal asymmetries during an emotional challenge (emotional film clips) 
moderated the relationship between stressful events and internalizing symptoms, such 
that high risk children showed a more rightward asymmetry than low risk peers while 
watching emotional films (Lopez-Duran et al., 2011). Additionally, Stewart and 
colleagues (2014) found that frontal asymmetry during emotional challenge is reliable 
across multiple EEG reference schemes, whereas resting EEG measures were found 
to be much less reliable across different EEG reference schemes. Together these 
findings indicate that frontal EEG asymmetries measured during emotional challenge 
may provide a more sensitive, and reliable, measure of vulnerability to depression. 
Two interesting questions arise from the capability model in relation to the 
findings of the current thesis. First, is frontal asymmetry under emotional challenge 
related to spontaneous emotion regulation? In other words, would emotion elicited 
frontal asymmetry reflect an underlying neural index of spontaneous emotion 
regulation as measured by the startle paradigm? Second, does frontal asymmetry 
under emotional challenge prospectively predict depression within the diathesis-stress 
model of depression? This second question is particularly interesting given that 
vulnerability to depression is considered a latent characteristic (see Ingram et al., 
2011), which may not be detectable unless an emotional challenge or stressor is 
experienced.  
Frontal Asymmetry by Parietal Asymmetry 
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While resting frontal asymmetry alone did not act as a vulnerability marker for 
depression, it was found that it did predict depression through stress, but only if right 
parietal activity was also considered. For individuals with low right parietal activity, 
frontal asymmetry predicted depression, both directly and within the diathesis-stress 
framework, such that more relative rightward frontal asymmetries predicted increases 
in depression and sensitivity to stress. Those with more leftward frontal asymmetry 
were resilient to depression and less sensitive to stress. However, for individuals with 
high right parietal activity there was no relationship between frontal asymmetry, 
stress and future depression symptoms. These findings are partially consistent with 
Heller’s (1993) Circumplex model of depression. Heller suggests that right parietal 
activity reflects arousal (high activity = high arousal; low activity = low arousal), and 
that frontal asymmetry reflects valence (leftward = positive; rightward = negative). 
Within this model, Heller argues that the combination of low right parietal activity 
(low arousal) and rightward frontal asymmetry (negative valence) reflects depression, 
while the combination of high right parietal activity (high arousal) and rightward 
frontal asymmetry (negative valence) reflects anxiety.  
The present thesis extends Heller’s (1993) model. While Heller primarily 
focused on the relationship between patterns of frontal by parietal activity and current 
depression, the present thesis examined how frontal by parietal activity acts as a 
vulnerability to depression, rather than a current indicator of depression. Results show 
that trait patterns of activity are present before depression occurs, and rather than 
predicting depression directly, frontal by parietal EEG patterns act a diathesis within 
the diathesis-stress model. In other words, low right parietal activity and rightward 
frontal asymmetry reflect stress sensitivity – that is, they affect how individuals 
respond to stress, which in turn influences depressive outcomes. However, this pattern 
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of frontal by parietal asymmetries appears to be a relatively distal predictor given that 
frontal by parietal activity interacted with stress at twelve months but not at three 
months. Interestingly, frontal and parietal activity did not relate to current depressive 
symptoms (reported in Study One). This is not necessarily at odds with Heller’s 
model as the present study included only healthy participants, and it is possible that 
the direct relationship only manifests for clinically depressed individuals. Importantly, 
frontal by parietal activity is shown here to be a trait emotion regulation marker that 
acts as a diathesis within the diathesis-stress framework. 
The Circumplex model’s distinction between depression and anxiety may also 
help to reconcile the lack of a direct predicted relationship between frontal asymmetry 
and depression (as described above). Heller and Nitschke (1998) propose that parietal 
asymmetry dissociates depression and anxiety, such that individuals with depression 
alone have low levels of right parietal activity but individuals with anxiety or anxiety 
comorbid with depression have high levels of right parietal activity. If the current 
sample all had low levels of anxiety (i.e., all showed low right parietal activity), then 
rightward frontal asymmetry may have predicted depression. However, if a significant 
proportion of my sample had higher levels of anxiety, then a direct frontal-asymmetry 
relationship should not be observed – in fact this relationship should be moderated by 
parietal asymmetry, which is what was found. However, as no measure of anxiety was 
included at time one, whether levels of anxiety account for my findings cannot be 
assessed.  
Regional EEG Activity and Attentional Bias 
In the current thesis I found that EEG activity predicted depression but did not 
relate to brooding rumination (the cognitive process measured), which raises the 
question of what cognitive processes regional EEG measures are tapping? One 
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possibility, argued to link cognitive and neurobiological vulnerability to depression is 
diminished attentional control. Diminished attentional control, observed in 
depression, has been proposed to lead to a bias towards processing negative 
information by the attentional system (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). De Raedt and 
Koster (2010) propose that exposure to stress over time (particularly during early 
childhood) affects the development of regulatory systems associated with the 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex. This leads to reduced control over attentional 
processes and less ability to control emotional processes under stress. These include 
reduced ability to inhibit (regulate) negative emotional responses or to orient attention 
away from negative information. This inability to adaptively control negative 
information processing then leads to sustained emotional responses to stress and many 
of the cognitive deficits observed in depression. For example, reduced ability to shift 
attention from negative events means negative information is maintained for longer in 
working memory (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008), which drives negative schemas and 
negative self-beliefs, and increases rumination.  
De Raedt and Koster’s (2010) attentional control framework may be a useful 
means of interpreting the results of this thesis. This model provides a useful 
integration of evidence from cognitive and biological lines of research and highlights 
the importance of attention in the etiology and presentation of depression. A key 
factor of De Raedt and Koster’s (2010) model is the interaction between frontal 
control systems and parietal attentional systems. The present thesis showed that 
combined rightward frontal and low right parietal EEG activity was a vulnerability 
factor that predicted sensitivity to stress twelve months later. Within the perspective 
of De Raedt and Koster’s model it could be considered that rightward frontal and low 
right parietal activity are indexing poor attentional control that results in a bias toward 
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negative emotional material. It may be that this negative attention bias underlies the 
observed link between regional EEG activity and depressive symptoms twelve 
months later.   
A recent study supports the possibility of a link between frontal and parietal 
EEG activity and an attentional bias toward negative information. Using a dot-probe 
task (see MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), Grimshaw and colleagues (2014) 
assessed whether regional EEG activity was related to attentional bias to threat (angry 
faces). They presented non-informative pairs of picture cues to either side of fixation, 
followed immediately by a probe stimulus in the location of one of the cues. The pairs 
of images comprised angry and neutral or happy and neutral faces. Faster responses to 
probes that appeared in the location previously occupied by an emotional stimulus are 
thought to index sustained attention to the emotional stimulus (MacLeod et al., 1986). 
They found that women with rightward frontal asymmetry and low right parietal 
activity showed an attentional bias to negative (threatening) information. In contrast, 
women with leftward frontal asymmetry showed no attentional bias, that is, they 
showed effective attentional control in the presence of threat. In light of the findings 
of the current thesis, this suggests that rightward frontal asymmetry and low right 
parietal acitivity indexes both a negative attentional bias and sensitivity to stress over 
time. Negative attentional biases have been shown to predict depression within the 
diathesis-stress framework (Beevers & Carver, 2003). It can therefore be 
hypothesised that rightward frontal asymmetry and low right parietal activity reflects 
an underlying bias to negative information and that this attentional bias in turn reflects 
a vulnerability to depression within the diathesis-stress framework.  
Although the relationship between frontal (and to some extent parietal) 
asymmetries and depression have been reported for a number of decades (see Allen 
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Coan & Allen, 2004; Thibodeau et al., 2006), research has only recently started to 
address the mechanisms that underlie this relationship. As such, currently there is no 
direct evidence in support of the hypothesis that frontal and parietal regional EEG 
activity reflects attentional mechanisms involved in vulnerability to depression. To 
address this gap, studies are required that simultaneously assess both regional EEG 
activity and attentional biases within a diathesis-stress framework. While still in its 
infancy, this line of research could be very valuable for untangling the roles of 
regional EEG activity and attentional control in vulnerability to depression.  
Spontaneous Emotion Regulation 
Spontaneous emotion regulation, as indexed by the startle eye-blink, predicted 
depression at three-months within the diathesis-stress model, consistent with evidence 
using self-report measures of trait emotion regulation (e.g. Garnefski, Kraaij, & 
Spinhoven, 2001). This is an important finding as, while habitual regulation processes 
(such as spontaneous regulation) have been proposed to act as a diathesis to 
depression (Davidson, 1998), this is the first study to show that an objective measure 
of habitual emotion regulation (startle indices of online emotion processing) 
prospectively predicts depression within the diathesis-stress model. Spontaneous 
emotion regulation did not directly predict depression, indicating that it reflects 
sensitivity to stress specifically.  
Interestingly, patterns of findings suggest that frontal by parietal activity and 
spontaneous emotion regulation act as independent diatheses. Spontaneous emotion 
regulation acted as a diathesis only at the three-month follow up, while frontal by 
parietal activity acted as a diathesis only at the twelve-month follow up. This is not 
entirely surprising given that in Study One these trait markers of emotion regulation 
were found to be different manifestations of vulnerability to depression (i.e., no 
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relationship was observed between frontal by parietal activity and spontaneous 
emotion regulation). As such, spontaneous emotion regulation appears to be a more 
proximal vulnerability marker and frontal by parietal activity a relatively more distal 
marker of stress sensitivity. 
The independent nature of frontal by parietal activity and spontaneous emotion 
regulation does not necessarily mean that frontal by parietal activity does not reflect 
spontaneous emotion regulation. While the startle eye-blink measure captures 
variation in effectiveness of emotion regulation strategies, it does not capture how the 
emotional response is regulated. In other words, a variety of strategies could be 
employed to regulate an emotional response but the startle methodology used is only 
sensitive to the outcome of this emotion regulation and not the specific strategy 
employed. For example, one individual may employ an attentional redeployment 
strategy to regulate their emotional response and another may employ a cognitive 
reappraisal strategy (to equal or differing effect). It is possible that frontal by parietal 
activity reflects only some types of emotion regulation strategies. If this were the 
case, then variation in strategies used by participants in the current study may have 
masked any relationship between regional EEG activity and emotion regulation. 
Therefore, any relationship between regional EEG activity and emotion regulation 
would only be detectable when specific strategies are used.  
In light of the capability model and the latent characteristic of vulnerability to 
depression, an alternative interpretation of the findings of Study Two can be 
proposed. Spontaneous emotion regulation at time one predicted sensitivity to stress 
at time two and was interpreted as indexing a proximal vulnerability marker within 
the diathesis stress framework. However, it could be that the startle measure of 
spontaneous regulation was tapping an already active (i.e., no longer latent) 
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vulnerability, instigated in response to stress at time one. In this scenario poorer 
spontaneous emotion regulation may be indexing currently experienced stress that is 
yet to be expressed as depressive symptoms. However, these symptoms may have 
been detectable at the short (three month) follow up. This question cannot be 
addressed in the current thesis as no measure of life stress was recorded at time one, 
thus stress at time one could not be controlled for. However, this hypothesis gives an 
alternative explanation for why poorer spontaneous emotion regulation interacted 
with stress to predict depression at time two. 
Brooding Rumination 
Brooding rumination was the only marker that did not act as a diathesis within 
the diathesis-stress model, suggesting that brooding rumination is not a marker of 
stress sensitivity. Although this finding is inconsistent with previous studies (Bastin et 
al., 2014 and Cox et al., 2011; but see Paredes & Zamalde, 2014), it could be that 
brooding is a diathesis for a subtype of stress that was not captured in the current 
thesis. The relationship between brooding, stress and depression has been found to be 
stressor dependent (e.g., Cox et al., 2011). For example, Cox et al., (2011) separated 
life stress into different categories (e.g., interpersonal and non-interpersonal stress). 
Importantly, they found that brooding interacted with some categories of stress to 
predict depression, but not others. The current study suggests that brooding 
rumination does not interact with a global measure of life stress to predict depression, 
but it is possible it interacts with subcategories of life stress that were not measured.  
While brooding rumination was not a trait marker of stress sensitivity, it was the 
only trait emotion regulation marker that directly predicted depression across time – 
although only at the three-month follow up. Interestingly, one previous study also 
found that brooding did not act as a stress sensitivity marker, but did directly predict 
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depression across time (Paredes & Zumalde, 2014). Further, a number of other studies 
have shown that brooding rumination directly predicts depression (e.g., Burwell & 
Shirk 2007; Mezulis et al., 2011). Brooding rumination was also the only marker that 
related to current depressive symptoms, as measured in Study One. One possible 
interpretation of this data is that brooding rumination and depressive symptoms are 
both independent but co-occurring responses to stress. If we accept this hypothesis, 
then increases in depressive symptoms will be accompanied by increases in brooding 
(as found in Study One) when both are in response to some form of stress. Further, 
brooding has been proposed to be a response to depressive symptoms whereby an 
individual attempts to cope with feelings of depression (Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 
2004). Brooding is a maladaptive coping strategy that acts to maintain depression 
(Joormann et al., 2006; Treynor et al., 2003), as well as increasing depression 
symptoms (as found in my Study Two). However, these ideas are speculative. The 
current study did not measure levels of life stress at time one, nor did it measure 
brooding at the follow up time points. As such, I can not thoroughly examine the 
degree to which depression and brooding co-vary over time.  
Summary  
An important implication of the current thesis is that frontal and parietal EEG 
activity, spontaneous emotion regulation and brooding rumination reflect independent 
markers of emotion regulation. Additionally, these three markers operate differently 
across time to predict depression. Brooding rumination seems particularly distinct 
from the other two markers as it directly predicted depression, but did not interact 
with stress to predict depression. Findings suggest that spontaneous emotion 
regulation and parietal by frontal EEG activity are markers of stress sensitivity. 
Spontaneous emotion regulation may act as a proximal marker of stress sensitivity, 
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while frontal by parietal activity may be a comparatively more distal marker of stress 
sensitivity. A limitation that should be kept in mind when interpreting results of the 
follow up studies is that different subsets of participants responded to the three-month 
and twelve-month follow-up surveys. Importantly, I could not conduct a time series 
analysis, meaning each follow up has to be considered in isolation. Thus when 
comparing the effects of different trait markers at each time point, I do so in different 
samples. Further, samples differed in a measure of interest - frontal asymmetry scores 
- at time two and time three. Although this does not undermine my results, ideally 
research should clarify the time courses of different emotion regulation measures in a 
consistent sample.  
My thesis builds on the idea that emotion regulation is important for 
understanding vulnerability to depression. Findings highlight that emotion regulation 
is not one uniform construct but consists of number of processes that may contribute 
independently to depression vulnerability. Considering multiple subtypes of emotion 
regulation will allow for more fine-grained insight into how depression develops 
across time, and the role of stress in depression. One important future research 
direction, is to clarify what cognitive processes are reflected by measures of regional 
EEG activity. Attentional control is a good candidate as a cognitive process that 
bridges the relationship between regional EEG activity and vulnerability to 
depression. Additionally, the use of refined measures of regional EEG activity (as 
described by the capability model) is likely to provide a more reliable measure of 
vulnerability to depression. My research provides a necessary step towards identifying 
emotion regulation measures that are critical for understanding vulnerability to 
depression.  
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Appendix A 
IAPS Images 
Standardised ratings for images 
from the International 
Affective Picture System 
(IAPS) used during the startle 
eye-blink paradigm. 
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Appendix B 
Beck Depression Inventory - II 
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(Beck, 1996) 
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Appendix C 
 Ruminative Response Scale & subscales 
 
NB. The Brooding Rumination subscale comprises items  5, 10, 13, 15, 16 (Treynor et 
al., 2003) 
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Appendix D  
The Life Events Questionnaire 
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(Norbeck, 1984) 
NB. This questionnaire was adapted for use in an online survey 
(ww.surveymonkey.com) and only “Bad” Events were measured. 
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Appendix E 
Mood and Anxiety Questionnaire mini (MASQ-mini) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Clark & Watson 1995) 
NB. The anxious arousal subscale comprises of items 4, 6, 8, 10, 14, 16, 18, 22, 24 & 
26. 
